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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three self-contained essays on urban agglom-
eration economies. The first essay studies the optimal population agglomer-
ation in a city in dynamic contexts. The second essay tests the local labor
market agglomeration economies in the Boston metropolitan area, focusing
on the effects of social interactions at workplaces on individual earnings. The
third essay tests the effects of social interactions at residential locations on
housing values.
Chapter 1, "Dynamic Henry George Theorem and Optimal City Sizes",
extends the static Henry George Theorem (HGT) to dynamic settings. Through
a series of simple dynamic models, we tentatively conclude that the HGT
holds in dynamic models in terms of present values. In economies with
congestion or production externalities, the dynamic HGT still holds if exter-
nalities are correctly priced.
Chapter 2, "Smart Cafe Cities: Testing Human Capital Externalities in
the Boston Metropolitan Area", uses the 1990 Massachusetts census data and
tests four types of human capital externalities at the microgeographic levels in
the Boston metropolitan area labor market: depth of human capital stock,
Marshallian labor market externalities, Jacobs labor market externalities,
and thickness of the local labor market. We find that all types of human
capital externalities are significant across census blocks. Different types of
externalities attenuate at different speeds over distances. For example, the
effect of human capital depth decays rapidly beyond three miles away from
a block centroid. We conclude that knowledge spillovers are very localized
within a microgeographic scope in cities that we call, "Smart Cafe Cities."
Chapter 3, "What Has Been Capitalized into Property Values: Human
Capital, Social Capital, and Cultural Capital?" , classifies three types of social-
interaction-based social amenities: human capital, social capital, and cultural
capital at residential neighborhood levels. We use the 1990 Massachusetts
census data and estimate hedonic housing models with social amenities. The
findings are as follows: (1) Human capital has significant positive effects on
property values. (2) Different types of social capital have different effects on
property values: an increase in the percentage of new residents has signifi-
cant positive effects on property values, probably due to the strength of weak
ties. However, an increase in the percentage of single-parent households has
negative effects on property values. (3) Cultural capital's effects vary from
high to low geographic levels, the effects of English proficiency and racial
homogeneity are positive at and beyond the tract level, but insignificant at
the block level.
Contents
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1: Dynamic Henry George Theorem and Optimal City Sizes 1
Chapter 1 Bibliography 34
Chapter 1 Appendix 36
Chapter 2: Smart Cafe Cities: Testing Human Capital Externalities in the
Boston Metropolitan Area 40
Chapter 2 Bibliography 78
Chapter 2 Appendix 81
Chapter 3: What Has Been Capitalized into Property Values: Human Capital,
Social Capital, and Cultural Capital? 86
Chapter 3 Bibliography 112
Chapter 3 Appendix 116
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertati.on was supported by the funding from the Robert Schalken-
bach Foundation, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Dissertation Fellow-
ship, and the Boston College M. Michael Mann Fellowship.
My single largest debt is to my parents, who invested virtually everything
they had in my education.
I am hugely indebted to the three incredible thesis advisors: Professors
Richard Arnott, Marvin Kraus, and Stephen Ross. I had the good fortune
to come across as their student. I am especially grateful to Richard Arnott,
who has had the greatest impact on my thinking.
All the three essays were presented at different conferences: the American
Real Estate and Urban Economics Association (AREUEA) mid-year meeting
on June 2, 2004 in Washington, D.C., the 18th AREUEA Annual Doctoral
Session in Philadelphia on January 6, 2005, and the 20th American Real
Estate Society Annual Doctoral Seminar in Santa Fe on April 13, 2005. The
first two essays were also presented at the department dissertation workshop
at Boston College. I thank the audience for their very helpful comments.
I also thank Jim Davis for all his help while I was working at the Boston
Census Research Data Center.
11
Chapter 1
Dynamic Henry George Theorem and
Optimal City Sizes
1.1 Introduction
Cities are concentrations of population. The social interactions of a high-density population
generate all types of positive and negative externalities in cities. On the one hand, as city
population increases, or as city size becomes larger, people benefit more from learning from
each other (knowledge spillover effects or human capital externalities). Firms benefit more
from being located together (localization economies or urbanization economies); consumers
save more traveling costs from multi-purpose trips (shopping externalities); and, the average
cost of providing urban public goods decreases, etc. These are examples of positive external-
ities of population concentration. On the other hand, negative externalities such as traffic
congestion, commuting distance or time, air pollution, and crime, also increase. There must
exist an optimal city size where the marginal benefit of "resident" equals its marginal cost.
What characterizes the optimal city size? The Henry George Theorem (HGT) states that
when a city has an optimal population size, the aggregate urban differential land rents can
cover the costs of pure public goods. This theorem has been applied to test empirically
whether or not the city of Tokyo is too large (Kanemoto et al. [17]).
Although Henry George invented the Single Tax Theory, urban and public finance econo-
mists discovered the HGT in the 1970s. The idea of the HGT dates back at least as far as
Hotelling [15] as well as George. Hotelling discovered that marginal pricing is the correct
way to maximize general welfare and proposed to use non-distortionary taxes to finance the
fixed costs of decreasing-cost industries. Such taxes are imposed on land values, income,
or inheritance. Bos [8] discussed the relationship between aggregate land rents, aggregate
transportation costs, and total fixed costs of production in a linear city. Serck-Hanssen
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[24], Flatters et al. [11], Starrett [25], and Vickrey [27] discovered the HGT independently.
Serck-Hanssen also studied a linear city and found that the differential land rents can
cover the production deficit from marginal pricing when the number of factories is opti-
mal. Vickrey treated the city as the concentration of increasing-returns-to-scale industries,
and demonstrated that the aggregate differential land rents can cover the fixed costs when
the amount of output is optimal. He dubbed his findings the "GHV Theorem" (George-
Hotelling-Vickrey Theorem).
The HGT has been generalized into congestion externalities (Arnott [2]), scale economy
in production (Arnott [2], Kanemoto [16]), heterogeneous agents (Stiglitz [26]), and multiple
regions (Hartwick [14]). In fact, the HGT holds in Pareto optimal spatial economies with
properly priced locations (Schweizer [22]). All of the above results are derived from static
models.
The static HGT, however, cannot answer the following questions on optimal city sizes
and financing of public goods in dynamic contexts:
1. We observe that the construction of a new city requires huge investments in urban
public goods, mainly infrastructures. Since infrastructures are durable, in later periods
only maintenance and capacity expansion are needed. Therefore, as we will show later, the
intertemporal optimum requires that the present value of differential land rents equal the
present value of expenditure on pure public goods. It does not necessarily require that the
HGT hold for every period.
2. The static HGT considers spatial equilibrium and static optimization, but the dy-
namic HGT considers both spatial equilibrium and intertemporal optimization. Transitional
dynamics and comparative dynamic analysis could be done for exogenous shocks, such as
3
technological progress in the transport sector or production sector.
3 Applying the static HGT to test optimal city size may be misleading, unless a city is
in a steady state and has a constant population size. During transitional periods, we expect
an optimal time path for city size.
4. A good understanding of the dynamic HGT could have important policy implications.
Examples from the real world are land pricing policy in industrial parks, infrastructure
financing policy in gated communities or growing cities, etc. For example, firms are co-
located in industrial parks (districts) to enjoy agglomeration economies, but initially firms
have little incentive to be the first to move into a new industrial park since there is little
agglomeration there. Park developers incur huge sunk costs at the beginning since they
need to provide all the infrastructure facilities before firms move in. Park developers charge
first movers lower land rents and later movers higher rents. This discriminatory pricing of
sites over time could partially overcome the inertia of firms' relocation (Rauch [20]). When
the number of firms is optimal, can the present value of land rents cover sunk costs and
first period subsidies to first movers?
Another example is impact fees. When a city keeps growing, new infrastructures need to
be constructed to provide public services for new residents. Nowadays, one typical way to
finance the incremental infrastructures is to charge impact fees: that is, the developer has to
pay for incremental infrastructures when developing a new site. Brueckner [9] proved that
a developer would not develop a site until the urban differential land rents at the location
equal the amortized (annual) costs of the infrastructure investments. If a city planner
provides new infrastructures as the city grows, will the increment of urban differential land
rents be able to cover the expenditure on incremental infrastructures?
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The third example is Chinese cities. Along with the rapid urbanization in China, new
cities and towns keep forming. Local governments have been intensively using urban land
rents to finance infrastructures because urban land belongs to the state and the city govern-
ments have the authority to control city sizes. Is the public ownership of urban land a more
efficient institutional arrangement for financing urban public services? To what extent can
the city planner (government) better internalize all kinds of urban externalities?
The above real problems could be better understood by applying the dynamic HGT.
However, further studies on these topics are beyond the intention of this paper.
There is no paper on the dynamic HGT. A very closely related paper is by Arnott
and Kraus [5]. They extended the static model of self-financing of congestible facilities to
dynamic models, and found that results of static models still hold in dynamic settings in
present value terms. Black and Henderson [7] mentioned the HGT in their endogenous
urban growth model, but their result is not significant here, since, in their model, the static
HGT holds in every period.
This paper extends the static HGT to dynamic models. Section 2 rephrases the static
model in a game-theoretic framework and the interpretations of the RGT; section 3 treats
pure public goods as durable and depreciable, and shows that the RGT holds in terms of
present value. Section 4 considers technology improvement in the transport sector as an
example of comparative dynamic analysis; section 5 takes into account congestion external-
ities in public goods and the transport sector, and finds that if congestion externalities are
correctly priced, the dynamic RGT still holds. Section 6 discusses production externalities
case; section 7 provides a simple open city model; section 8 concludes.
5
1.2 HGT in the static lllodel
In this section, we derive the HGT from a static model based on Fujita and Thisse [12].
They used a one dimensional linear city model. Here we use a two-dimensional urban space:
a monocentric circular city with a city planner and pure public goods. We will also review
different interpretations of the HGT.
Assume there is a point central business district (CBD) surrounded by a circular res-
idential area in a featureless plain. Consider the following simple two-stage Stackelberg
game: In the first stage, a benevolent city planner rents agricultural land from an absentee
landlord at rent, RA, as urban land. She decides to provide pure public goods, P, and selects
N people immigrating to the city. She also needs to design a location-based transfer scheme
r(x) (x denotes location or distance away from the CBD), since residents are different only
in terms of locations; r(x) could be taxes or subsidies. In the second stage, given the public
goods and specified transfer scheme, the N identical immigrants in this closed city compete
with each other for locations in the residential area to maximize their utility. Residents
commute to the CBD to work, each has the same exogenous general-purpose output per
capita Y, which could be used as composite goods consumption C, transport services, land
rents, and taxes, if applicable. Obviously the first stage is a planner's problem and an
optimization problem; the second stage is a decentralization problem and an equilibrium
problem, which is the standard monocentric city model in new urban economics literature.
To simplify the model, we assume fixed lot size L, constant commuting cost per unit
distance T , and the absence of traffic congestion. The planner's goal is to maximize the
6
representative resident's utility.!
We solve the model by backward-induction. From the point of view of residents at
location x, each has resource Y plus transfer T(X), which will be spent on consumption C,
land rents r(x )L, and transport costs Tx. Residents consume free pure public goods since
the marginal cost of pure public goods is zero. The equal utility constraint implies that
every resident consumes the same amount of consumption goods.
The representative resident's problem is modeled as follows:
MaxU(C, P, L),
c,x
s.t. C + r(x)L + Tx = Y - T(X).
The utility function U (C, P, L) is assumed to have all the classic properties. To maxi-
mize individual utility is the same as maximizing individual consumption. The first order
condition is
'( ) __ T + T' (x )
r x - L'
which is the spatial equilibrium condition. Together with the boundary condition
10bviously, we need to specify a social welfare function for the city planner since there are N residents
in the city. One of the annoying problems in spatial models is that maximizing social welfare (except in the
Rawlsian social welfare function) results in equal people having unequal utility levels due to non-convexity
(Mirrlees [19], Arnott and Riley [1]). In this section, since we assume people are identical and consume the
same fixed lot size, the spatial equilibrium results in equal utility across locations, so the planner's objective
is reduced to maximizing utility per capita or utility level of the representative resident.
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where b is the city boundary, we can derive the bid rent function
() R Tb-Tx+T(b)-T(X)rx== A+ L . (1)
From (1) we can see that not only are all transport cost savings fully reflected by land rents,
but also the tax benefit or costs are fully capitalized into land rents. Denoting the optimal
consumption of composite goods as C*, the bid rent function can also be written as
Y-C*-TX-T(X)
r(x)== L .
C* depends on exogenous parameters Nand T(b) :
(2)
C*[N, r(b)] = Y - RAL - Tb - r(b) = Y - RAL - ~AN~ - r(b), (3)
where A == ~T(~)~ is a constant. The aggregate land rents (ALR), which residents pay to
the city planner are:
rb 1 3 rb [T(b) - T(X)]ALR = Jo 21rxr(x)dx = NLRA + 2" AN2 + Jo 21rX L dx.
Define urban differential land rents (DLR) as:
DLR = lb 21rx[r(x) - r A]dx.
8
(4)
Therefore,
DLR = ~AN~ + lb 21l"x [T(b) ~ T(X)] dx.
The aggregate transport costs (ATC) are:
rb 21rX 3
ATe = Jo L Txdx = AN'i.
Obviously, DLR is half the ATC in the absence of transfer scheme.2
(5)
(6)
From the point view of the city planner, her goal is to maximize the representative
resident's utility by choosing an optimal city size N, public goods expenditure P, and a
location-based transfer scheme T(X), subject to a budget constraint (which will be specified
later). The planner knows that residents will behave competitively and optimally to allocate
their resources among consumption, land rents, and commuting, to maximize their utility:
that is, the planner can solve residents' optimal reaction C*. The city planner's problem is:
Max U[C*(N,T(b)),P,L],
P,N,T(X)
s.t. (7)
(7) is the planner's budget constraint. The revenue from urban land rents net of aggregate
transfers must be able to cover the public goods expenditure and the opportunity costs of
urban land. 3
2 For the relationship between aggregate land rents and aggregate transport costs, see Arnott and Stiglitz
[3,4].
3 The problem of maximizing per head utility with respect to private consumption, public consumption,
and population size, is called club efficient by Schweizer [23]. The conventional maximization problem with
respect to private and public consumption is called efficient, while with respect to private consumption and
population it is called population efficient. In our specification, from an individual resident's problem, the
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Plugging (2) into (7), we can find the aggregate resource constraint for the city planner:
3
NC* + AN2 + NLRA + P ~ NY. (7')
From (7') we see that the optimal consumption does not depend on the transfer scheme.
This is because the effects of the transfer scheme are fully reflected by land rents. Without
loss of generality, we set T(X) = T in the ensuing analysis.
The city planner's problem can be reduced to:
MaxU[C(N, T), P, L],
P,N,T
1 3
s.t. "2AN2" + NT ~ P. (8)
Let A > 0 denote the Langrangian multiplier for constraint (8). The first order conditions
(FOCs) for N, P, and T are as follows:
P:Up=A,
T: UCCT = -AN.
(9)
(11)
Since CT = -1, CN = -iAN-~, insert (11) into (9), and we see T = O. The budget
optimal consumption only depends on Nand r(x), so the planner's choice variables reduce to P, N, and
r(x). This is equivalent to the club efficiency.
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constraint (8) becomes
1 3
2"AN"2 = P = DLR. (12)
(12) means that for any level of pure public goods, when the city population size is opti-
mal, the optimal transfer is 0, and the DLR can cover the pure public goods expenditure.
Since this single confiscatory tax on urban differential land rents can exactly finance the
urban public goods, this rule is dubbed the Henry George Theorem in urban public finance
literature, based on the Single Tax Theory of Henry George [13].
Note that the average cost of public goods is ;, the average commuting cost per person
is AN~. The marginal benefit of adding one more resident to this city is the decrease
of the average cost of public goods: ~f = --J;.; the marginal cost is the increase of
average commuting cost ~AN- ~. When the population size is optimal, the marginal cost
of "resident" equals its marginal benefit:
(13)
which is the same as (12). This is the intuition we mentioned earlier.
The spatial equilibrium in the second stage problem is a competitive equilibrium, which
is Pareto efficient according to the first welfare theorem. This is a simple case of Schweizer's
conclusion: the Pareto efficiency of spatial allocation implies the HGT.
There are other various ways to interpret the HGT:
1. Suppose there exists a perfectly competitive market for "cities" (one developer in
each city). The costs of development are land opportunity costs plus pure public goods
expenditure, and the only revenue is urban land rents collected from residents. Competition
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will drive profits to zero, so in the competitive equilibrium of a city development market,
land rents collected equal land opportunity costs plus pure public goods expenditure. Thus,
the HGT holds (Fujita and Thisse [12]). Section 7 presents a simple open city model that
demonstrates this intuition.
2. There exist two opposing forces in cities as population increases: Forces of increasing
returns to scale such as production externalities or public goods, and forces of decreasing
returns to scale such as aggregate (average) transport costs, land rents, and congestion
externalities. The optimal city size occurs in the locally constant returns to scale, where
the forces of increasing returns to scale are offset by the forces of decreasing returns to scale.
In the simplest case, if pure public good is the only force of increasing returns to scale, and
land rents (or transport costs) are the only force of decreasing returns to scale, then, under
marginal cost pricing, the profits from the force of decreasing returns to scale just equal the
loss from the force of increasing returns to scale. That is, aggregate differential land rents
equal pure public goods expenditure (Vickrey [27], Arnott [6]).
Further interpretations of the HGT include the efficiency of marginal pricing (Hotelling
[15]), Edgeworth's principle (Schweizer [21]), city as a club, etc.
1.3 A silllple dynamic HGT lllodel
In this section, we treat pure public goods as durable and depreciable, and construct a
simple dynamic model which shows that the HGT holds in terms of present value. The
methodology is mainly based on Arnott and Kraus [5].
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1.3.1 Model setup
We use assumptions of the standard monocentric circular city model in section 2.
1. Assume all residents are identical, and each person consumes fixed lot size L. So, if
1
at time t, there are N(t) residents in the city, the city boundary b(t) is [N~)L] 2.
2. Assume that commuting cost per unit distance is e'fty, where T is a constant across
different locations, and ()(t) is a transport technology shift. If there is a transport technology
improvement, then unit distance commuting cost will decrease. For this section, we assume
()(t) = 1, i.e., no transport technological progress. The total transport costs at time tare
(b(t) 21rX 3
Jo yTxdx = AN(t)2.
From the spatial equilibrium problem in section 2, we know that residential land rents
reflect only the savings of transport costs. If agricultural land rents per unit area is RA,
then aggregate land rents payment at time tare:
(b(t) 1 3
Jo 27rxr(x, t)dx = "2AN(t)2 + N(t)LRA.
The aggregate differential land rents at time tare
1 3
DLR(t) = 2AN(t)2. (14)
3. The production at the CBD is assumed to be exogenous, so, income per capita
Y(t) is exogenous. The general-purpose output goods can be used as consumption C(t),
commuting services, pure local public goods investment I(t), and a head tax T imposed by
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the planner. Assume, too, that public goods are durable. The city planner has to decide
which is the expenditure on public goods at time 0, P(O), and which is the path of public
goods investment, I(t), so as to cover depreciation and maintenance.
4. The utility function of a representative resident living at location x is:
U(x, t) = U[C(x, t), P(x, t), L(x, t)].
Since we have assumed fixed lot size, pure public goods, and equal utility across locations,
the utility function can be reduced to:
U(x, t) = U(t) = U[C(t), P(t), L].
5. Contrary to the closed city and open city dichotomy found in urban literature, we
assume an open city with growth control. Imagine in a developing country under urban-
ization, where the smaller urban area is surrounded by a larger rural area. The individual
utility level in the urban area is higher than that in the rural area, so, the rural population
will keep moving into the urban area if migration is free and costless, until utility level is
equalized. Here, however, we assume that the city planner has the power to control urban
population growth through lot size control, residence administration, or other similar ways,
so that a large utility gap between urban and rural area can be maintained for a long time.
4
The city planner has to choose an optimal population path N(t), an initial public goods
4This is happening in China now. One problem related to growth control is that the boundary condition
may not hold.
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expenditure P(O), and an optimal path of public goods investment I(t), so as to maximize
the discounted present value of individual life-time utility (assume infinite horizon). After
the planner's problem is solved, at any time t, the N(t) residents in the city compete with
each other for locations in order to achieve the same maximum utility level U(t) across
10cations.5 By backward induction, the planner knows the optimal reactions of residents,
so, in the ensuing analysis, we only focus on the planner's problem.
Let r denote the subjective discount rate. The present value of the life-time utility
of an individual who moves into the city at time t is ItOO e-rtU(t)dt. Correspondingly,
IoOO e-rtU(t)dt is the present value of the life-time utility of an individual who moves into
the city at time O. Since the optimal life path of an immigrant at t is exactly the same part
of the optimal path of an immigrant at time 0 starting from time t. Then, according to the
Pontryagin Maximum Principle, the optimal life path for an immigrant at time 0 implies
the optimal life path for any immigrants at any later time t, therefore the city planner's
problem can be reduced to just find the optimal life path for an immigrant at time O.
Since the city planner's objective is reduced to maximizing the present value of life-time
utility of individual immigrants at time 0, subject to the planner's resource constraint, the
planner's problem can be described as follows:
Max (X> e-rtU[C(t),P(t),L]dt,
N(t),T,I(t) Jo
5We need to assume that the planner has access to the capital market but residents do not. Otherwise,
residents will choose an optimal time path of locations based on their life-time credit constraints. This will
involve partial differetial equations which make the problem very complicated.
15
s.t100 e- rt [N(t)T + ~AN(t)~ ] dt = P(O) +100 e-rt I(t)dt,
pI (t) = I (t) - f5 P (t) ,
3 1
C[N(t), Y(t), 7] = Y(t) - RAL - "2 AN(t) 2 - 7,
P(O), P(oo) free,
(16)
(17)
where I(t) is the public goods investment at time t, f5 is the depreciation and maintenance
rate of public goods, r is the discount rate. 6 Note that (15) is an isoperimetric constraint,
and (17) is directly from (3). We will drop the argument t later for simplicity. The current-
value Hamiltonian is:
1 3
H = U(C, P, L) + >"(NT + 2AN2 - I) + J.L(I - 8P),
where A and J-l(t) are associated marginal valuations with respect to constraint (15) and
(16). The FOes for 7 and N are:
and
7: Uc-AN= 0, (18)
(19)
6The subjective rate of discounting utility should be different from discount rate for capital market, but
this does not generate new insight. So, to simplify the model, we choose the same discount rate for both
utility and capital.
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respectively. Combining (18) and (19), we have:
T = o.
Substitute (20) into the budget constraint (15), and we see:
100 1 3 100e-rt -AN2dt = P(O) + e-rtldt.0 2 0
Using (14), (21) is the same as (21'):
100 e-rt DLR(t)dt = P(O) +100 e-rt I(t)dt.
(20)
(21)
(21')
(21') is the dynamic version of the HGT in a simple case: For any given path of public
goods expenditure, when the optimal population path is chosen, the present value of urban
differential land rents over all time periods (i.e., the urban differential land value at time 0)
equals the initial public goods expenditure P(O) plus the discounted value of public goods
investment over all the time periods. It goes without saying that the dynamic HGT does not
require that the differential land rents equal the public goods expenditure at every period.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In a monocentric city with fixed lot size and exogenous production, if the
city planner's objective is to maximize the present value of representative resident's life-time
utility, then for any given time path of public goods expenditure, when the population path
is optimal, the present value of urban differential land rents over all time periods equals the
present value of expenditure (investment) on pure public goods over all the time periods.
17
That is, the Henry George Theorem holds in terms of present value.
The FOes for I and Pare:
I : A = J-l(t),
and
(22)
(23)
respectively. Note that from (18), (22) and (23), we have a dynamic version of the Samuelson
condition for pure public goods:
Uc N
Up r+b'-~'
f.L
The transversality condition for P(O) is:
(24)
A is the marginal value of one dollar of income or consumption in terms of utility, and J-l
is the marginal value of one dollar of public goods stock in terms of utility. At time 0,
the marginal value of allocating one dollar to consumption and public goods should be the
same.
The transversality condition for P is lim J-l(t)P(t)e- rt = 0 .
t--+oo
1.3.2 Steady state
In this subsection, we discuss the steady state of the model and properties of the optimal
paths of population, consumption, and public goods stock.
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Total differentiate (18) and (23) with respect to t, and we find:
(25)
and
(26)
(25), (26) can be written in the matrix form:
UCCCN - A Ucp N' -UccCyY' (27)
UPCCN Upp P' -UpcCyY'
Define
UCCCN - A Ucp
D=
UPCCN Upp
so IDI = CN(UCCUpp - U8p) - AUpp. If the utility function is strictly concave, then the
Hessian matrix is negative definite, which means that UccUpp - ubp > 0, Ucc < 0, and
Upp < O. Since CN < 0, without concrete specification of the utility function, IDI could be
positive, negative or zero. Possible cases are as follows:
Case 1: If IDI =1= 0, and the exogenous income Y(t) = Y, then the solution is P'(t) = 0
and N' = 0, therefore C' = o. The steady state means c;; = ~ = j; = O. This implies
that if there is a city planner with perfect foresight and infinite horizon, there exists a
unique steady state optimal city size N* from the long run, though this city size may
not be optimal for some periods from the static point of view. The city planner chooses
the optimal population N* and the optimal public goods P* = P(O) at the initial period
19
and keeps these values the same over time. Investment at every period covers just the
depreciation and maintenance of public goods stock; the differential land rents collected
through all the periods cover the initial public goods expenditure and the later expenditure
on depreciation and maintenance.
Note from (16) we have:
faOO e-rt(p' + I5P)dt
(r + 15) faoo e-rt P(t)dt - P(O).
Combine (21') and the steady state properties, and we have:
rOO e-rtDLR(t)dt = (r + 8)P(O).
io r (28)
(28) means that the urban differential land value at time 0 equals the value of amortized
public goods expenditure. Also, note that since population is constant, so urban differential
land rents are constant over time. But, the flow of public goods expenditure is not constant,
with a huge fixed cost of P(O) at time, 0, and constant investment c5P(O) thereafter. Thus,
the dynamic version of the HGT does not require that the static HGT hold period by period.
Since (C*, P*, N*) consists of a steady state, it is easy to solve for these variables, if the
utility function is known. For example, from (28), we can solve for the optimal city size
(29)
20
If we assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function
where 0 < a < 1, 0 < f3 < 1, and a + f3 < 1, then the optimal city size is:
N*==
(See appendix A.)
(30)
A numerical example may be helpful to see how large this city size is. Suppose a
representative resident's annual income Y == $40,000; lot size is 0.1 acre. Since land value
usually comprises one-third of the housing value, we will adjust lot size to be 0.3 acre,
since we do not include structures in our model. So, L ~ 0.00047 square miles (1 square
miles==640 acres). Let RA == $15,000 per acre; let T == $250 per mile per year. Housing
expenditure usually takes one-third of household income, so we set 1 - a - f3 == 0.3; public
goods expenditure is approximately equal to the tax payment, say f3 == 0.1, so, a == 0.6.
Given these parameter values, N* ~ 14,808,039. This is a big city like New York.
(30) implies that the optimal city size depends on income level, opportunity costs of
land, and transport costs. Higher income will expedite the urbanization process. This may
explain the rapid urbanization process that occurred with rapid industrialization. Another
implication is that if different cities have different levels of income due to the concentration
of different industries, then we will have a system of cities with different optimal city sizes.
Bigger cities have higher income per capita, which has been supported by empirical evidence.
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Case 2: If IDI == 0, and the exogenous income Y(t) == Y, then we will have multiple
solutions for N' and P'. We rule out this case.
Case 3: If IDI < 0, Y' > 0, and Upo < 0, then N' > 0, P' > 0. However, Upo < °is
rather strange. If IDI < 0, Y' > 0, and Upo == 0, then N' > O,and P' == O. Upo == 0 is
reasonable. For example, U == a log C + f3log P. Case 3 implies that persistent growth in
income or production can drive cities to expand persistently, which is consistent with the
recent urban endogenous growth models (Eaton and Eckstein [10], Black and Henderson
[7]).
The above simple model resembles a rental market of pure public goods, since the only
intertemporal linkage is the constant investment necessary to cover the depreciation of the
initial public goods stock. However, it does generate a dynamic version of the HGT. A more
realistic extension is to add convex adjustment costs of investment, but this will not alter
the properties of the dynamic HGT.
1.4 COlllparative dynamics: technology progress in the trans-
port sector
The comparative static analysis of a monocentric city model (Wheaton [28]) has contributed
many insights to urban economics. In this section, however, we will do some comparative
dynamic analysis, taking transport technology improvement as an example.
Recall that assumption (2) in section 3 specified the commuting cost per unit distance
as oftJ, here, we further assume that there is a constant technological improvement in the
transport sector: ~(:} = g, which implies that the commuting cost per unit distance will
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decrease at the rate of g. Without loss of generality, define B(t) = Begt , where Bis a constant.
Then, the commuting cost per unit distance at time t is te-gt. With this modification, the
model becomes:
Max roo e-rtU(C,P,L)dt,
N(t),T,I(t) Jo
P'(t) = I(t) - 6P(t),
3A _ t 1C(N Y T) = Y - RAL - --e g N2 - T
, , 2 () .
Combining the FOCs of Nand T, and the budget constraint, we have:
100 1A 3 100e-rt --e-gt N(t)2dt = P(O) + e-rtI(t)dt,o 2 B 0
or
100 e-rt DLR(t)dt = P(O) +100 e-rt I(t)dt.
The dynamic HGT still holds, except commuting costs are modified.
(31)
(32)
To analyze the optimal city population path, again we assume an exogenous income
path Y(t) = Y. A steady state consumption path implies that the growth rate of city size is
2g. As an example, total differentiate (31) with respect to t and set C'(t) = 0, and we find:
N'
N =2g.
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(33)
If Ucp > 0, then,
pI = 2 Ucgu 'CP
and the growth rate of public goods stock is positive. If the utility function is also assumed
to be U(t) == C(t)a P(t)!3L 1- a-!3, then j = ~. If we write N(t) = N(0)e2gt and P(t) ==
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P(O)e7ft, insert them into the dynamic HGT formula (32), and if ~ < r, then we find the
following equation for the initial city size and public goods stock:
N(O) = (2B(r - 2g)(r i £5)P(O)]~.
A(r - $) (34)
Obviously, if f) == 1 and g = 0 ( no technology improvement in the transport sector), then
N* == [2(r+l)P*]j, which is exactly the same as (29). By combining the spatial equilibrium
condition at time 0, we can completely solve for the optimal trajectories for consumption,
city size, and public goods stock.
We can see from (34) that an anticipated constant technology improvement in the trans-
port sector could be the driving force of persistent city growth. Since 8~~O) > 0, a larger
anticipated technology improvement in the transport sector not only results in a higher
growth rate of city population, but also in a larger scale of initial city size.
1.5 Congestion externalities
In our model, there could be two types of congestion, one is congestible public goods,
another is traffic congestion. We will analyze both in turn.
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1.5.1 Congestible public goods
If public goods are congestible, then individual utility from public goods is affected by the
total population. We specify individual utility function as:
U[C, F(P, N), L],
where Fp > 0, FN < 0, Up > 0. All other aspects remain the same as in section 3. Therefore,
the planner's objective function is:
Max [00 e-rtU[C(N, r), F(P, N), L]dt.
N(t),T,I(t) Jo
The constraints (15)-(17) still hold.
Combine the FOCs of Nand r, and we have:
(35)
Substitute (34) into the budget constraint, and we see the dynamic RGT in a congestion
case:
(36)
Obviously, UpFN is the negative congestion externality, or disutility, imposed on another
resident by adding one more resident. A is the marginal valuation of adding one more unit of
public goods stock in terms of utility to a representative resident. Let ¢ be the total utility
brought to all residents by an extra unit of public goods, then NA == ¢. Therefore, ~UpFN
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= NU$FN is the material value of the total disutility in terms of the general purpose goods
generated by adding one more resident; and, tNUFFN is the total disutility (in terms of
material value) generated by all residents or aggregate congestion externalities. If congestion
externalities are not priced, then the present value of market differential land rents is less
than the present value of public goods expenditure. If a toll is implemented and is set to
equal the congestion externalities imposed by a marginal resident, then the present value
of DLR and toll revenue equals the present value of public goods expenditure. That is, the
dynamic RGT holds in terms of shadow differential land rents and present value.
Proposition 2: If a toll is set to equal the congestion externalities generated by a marginal
resident, then the present value of differential land rents and toll revenue over all time
periods equals the present value of public goods expenditure over all time periods.
1.5.2 Traffic congestion
In this section, we model traffic congestion based on Mills and Ferranti [18], Arnott [2], and
Kanemoto [16], and conclude that if traffic congestion externalities are correctly priced,
then the present value of differential rents and toll revenue equals the present value of
public goods expenditure over all time periods.
Assume at any residential ring, there is a fixed proportion of land s used for residential
purpose, and 1 - s share to roads. To make things simple, we set a fixed lot size of L = 1.
The private transport cost of moving a resident at x to the CBD is: J; G[W(z), Q(z)]dz,
Gw < 0, GQ > 0, where W(z) is the road width (the amount of land allocated to road use)
at location z, and Q(z) is the accumulated traffic flow from the city boundary to location
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z:
The congestion externalities incurred by a person at location x is: J; GQQ(z)dz. So, the
aggregate congestion externalities (ACE) in the city is:
If congestion is unpriced, the aggregate (private) transport costs are:
ATC = lb 21rxS [lX G(W, Q)dZ] dx.
(37)
To compute the aggregate land rents, we have to consider the spatial equilibrium prob-
lem. Suppose the planner imposes the same head tax T to all residents.7 If congestion is
unpriced, residents will use market land rents as the price signal to compete for locations.
Therefore the spatial equilibrium problem is:
MaxU(C,P)
c,x
s.t. C + r(x) + lX G [W(z), Q(z)] dz = Y - T.
7 This could be interpreted as a uniform toll, which will be clear in the end of this section.
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The spatial equilibrium condition is r'(x) = -G(x). The optimal consumption is:
C(N, T) = Y - T - RA - 1b G [W(z), Q(z)] dz.
The bid-rent function is:
r(x) = RA +1b G(z)dz -1x G(z)dz,
r(O) = RA +1b G(z)dz.
The aggregate land rents are
Therefore, the urban differential land rents are:
Now come back to the dynamic model:
Max roo e-rtU[C(N, T), P]dt,
N(t),T,I(t) Jo
8 Apply integration by parts and the Liebnitz's rule.
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(38)
(39)
pI == I - JP,
and the constraint (38).
The FOCs for 'T and N are:
'T : Uc == AN,
and
Note that from (38),
eN = -!!!.-C(b) - rb 8C(x) dx
dN Jo aN .
Combine (40) and (42), and (41) can be reduced to:
lbaG(x) lb aG(x)- N--dx + 'T + 1rS --x2dx == 0,o aN 0 aN
or
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
So, when the planner sets the optimal population size, the optimal tax equals the congestion
externalities generated from adding one more resident at the city boundary. Insert (43) into
the budget constraint, and we find the dynamic RGT in a congested city to be:
Again, if traffic congestion is correctly priced, the present value of market differential land
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rents plus toll revenue equals the present value of public goods expenditure across time.
It is worth noting that the aggregate toll revenue NT is not equal to the aggregate
congestion externalities (37) because of marginal pricing in space. The difference between
the aggregate toll revenue and the aggregate congestion externalities is exactly the difference
between the aggregate shadow land rents (or social land rents) and the aggregate market
land rents. The proof is in appendix B.
This section shows that in an urban economy with congestion externalities, the dynamic
HGT still holds if congestion externalities are properly priced. The generality of the HGT
in distorted economies with unpriced congestion externalities was discussed in Arnott [6].
1.6 Production externalities
If production in a city delivers positive externalities or external economies, then it should be
subsidized to achieve the efficient scale. In this case, the static HGT says that the aggregate
differential land rents will be able to subsidize the positive production externalities and cover
the public goods expenditure. In a dynamic model, the HGT still holds in present value
terms. This section will demonstrate this result.
Assume identical residents have the same productivity Y(t), but individual production
benefits from the concentration of population. Let f(N) > 1 be a multiplicative productivity
shift or external externalities, then the, actual output of a resident is f(N)Y(t). In our
model, f(N) could be explained as localization economies or urbanization economies since
we assume only one industry in the city. The aggregate output in the city at time t
is N(t)f[N(t)]Y(t). The marginal externalities generated by an additional resident are
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Nf' (N) Y, thus, the aggregate externalities are N 2f' (N) Y.
The dynamic model is set as follows:
Max roo e-rtU(C, P, L)dt,
N(t),T ,let) J0
P'(t) == I(t) - 8P(t),
Combine the FOCs for T and N, and we have:
T == -Nf'(N)Y. (44)
The optimal tax is the subsidy that equals the production externalities incurred by an
additional resident.
Insert (44) into the budget constraint, and we have:
(45)
(45) shows that the present value of market differential land rents equals the present value
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of Pigouvian subsidies to the production externalities and expenditure on public goods.
This conclusion is of practical importance as far as land pricing policies in industrial parks
are concerned, where production has strong agglomeration economies, and firms share high
quality infrastructures.
1.7 An open city ll10del
To demonstrate the dynamic HGT, this section presents a simple dynamic model in an open
city. Assume there is a system of cities of different sizes. Cities are open in terms of free and
costless inter-city migration. There is a city developer in each city. The developer provides
free pure public goods to establish a new city, and charges every resident a head tax T
and urban land rents. To ensure residents live in her city, the developer must guarantee
residents in her city at least the utility level u which is prevailing in other cities and can
be considered as exogenous. The developer's goal is to maximize the present value of flow
profits. The profits at time t are the sum of urban differential land rents and tax revenue
minus investment on public goods. If the city development market is perfectly competitive,
then, in equilibrium, each developer gets zero discounted profits. Thus, the dynamic model
for an open city can be summarized as follows:
Max fCXJ e-rt [(NT + -21 AN~ - I)] dt - P(O),
N(t),T,I(t) io
s.t.1°O e~rtu(c,p,L)dt=u,
P'(t) = I(t) - bP(t),
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plus the constraint (17). Since we know that competitive equilibrium implies that the
present value of profits is zero, to test the dynamic RGT, we need to check to see whether
the optimal tax is zero as well. The combination of the FOes for Nand T does imply that
the optimal tax T equals zero; thus, the HGT also holds in the open city case.
1.8 Conelusions
In this paper we show that the Henry George Theorem holds in terms of present value in
various dynamic contexts. However, a general proof of the dynamic HGT is very difficult,
since a general dynamic spatial model involves optimal control problems governed by first
order partial differential equations, rarely employed in economics. In addition, it is very
hard to characterize the generality of spatial economy. However, some extensions such
as variable lot size, and convex adjustment costs in public goods investment, are fairly
tractable. The tentative conclusions we obtain could shed light on practical problems, such
as impact fees, land pricing policy in industrial districts, and land value taxation. However,
policy analysis and applications would be worth separate papers.
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Appendix A:
Assume the utility function of a representative resident living at location x is
U(x, t) = C(X, t)CtP(X, t)f3L(x, t)l-a- f3 .
Since we assumed fixed lot size and pure public goods with equal utility constraint, the
utility function can be reduced to
U(x, t) = U(t) = C(t)aP(t)f3L 1- a-f3.
The city planner's problem is:
rCA) 1 3 rCA)
s.t io e-rt(NT + 2AN"2)dt = P(O) + io e-rt Idt,
pI = 1- 8P,
3 1
C(N, Y,'T) = Y - RAL - 2AN2 - 'T.
The current-value Hamiltonian is:
H = ca p!3L 1- a -!3 + >"(NT + ~AN~ - I) + p,(I - 8P),
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(AI)
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
where A and f-l(t) are associated marginal valuations with respect to constraint (A2) and
(A3). The FOes for T, N, I, and Pare:
T : aCa - 1p/3L 1- a -/3 == AN,
and
Substituting (A5) into (A6), we obtain:
T == D.
Therefore, (A2) becomes:
From (A5) and (A8), we can derive (AID) and (All) as:
0' P' N'(a-l)C+ 13 p== N'
and
f-l' 13 NC
- - r - fJ == ---.
f-l a P
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(A5)
(A6)
(A7)
(A8)
(A9)
(AID)
(All)
In steady state, ~ = ~ = 0, ~t~ = 8, which implies P(t) = P*, I(t) = 8P*. By using
(AID) and (All), we see c; = ~ = D. This steady state is unique. Therefore, the steady
state means that the city planner will choose optimal population N* and the optimal public
goods P*at the initial period and keep these levels of value over time. From (A9) we have:
N*~ = 2(r + b)P* .
A
Combine (All) and (A4), solve for optimal city size:
Appendix B
The difference between aggregate toll revenue and aggregate congestion externalities is
NT-ACE N l b GQQ(x)dx-lb 21l"XS [l X GQQ(Z)dZ] dx
N l
b
GQQ(x)dx-l
b
21l"XS [l
b
GQQ(z)dz-l
b
GQQ(Z)dZ] dx
l
b
21l"XS [l
b
GQQdZ] dx.
If congestion is unpriced, the slope of market rents curve is:
r'(x) = -G.
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The slope of shadow rents curve is:
At location x, the difference between shadow rents S(x) and market rents r(x) is:
S(x) - r(x) = -lb [S'(z) - r'(z)] dz = l b GQQdz,
since in a closed city, S(b) = r(b) = RA. Therefore, the difference between the aggregate
shadow rents and the aggregate market rents are:
which equal the difference between the aggregate toll revenue and the aggregate congestion
externalities.
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Chapter 2
Smart Cafe Cities: Testing Human
Capital Externalities in the Boston
Metropolitan Area
Even walking with any two other people, I will always find a teacher among
them.
--- Confucius, Analects, Book 7,21
Most of what we know we learn from other people. We pay tuition to a few
of these teachers ... but most of it we get for free, and often in ways that are
mutual-without a distinction between student and teacher ... What can people
be paying Manhattan or downtown Chicago rents for, if not for being near other
people?
---Robert E. Lucas, Jr., 1988, p.38-39
Existing studies have explored either only one or two of the mechanisms that human
capital externalities percolate at only macrogeographic levels. The contribution of this
paper, by using the 1990 Massachusetts census data, is to provide empirical evidence for
four mechanisms at microgeographic levels. We test four channels through which individual
workers can learn from their occupational and industrial peers in the same local labor
market: depth of human capital stock, Marshallian labor market externalities, Jacobs labor
market externalities, and thickness of the local labor market. We find that all these channels
are strong and significant - but at different ge~graphic scales - and that they attenuate
spatially at different speeds. We conclude that knowledge spillovers are very localized
within a microgeographic scope in cities that we call, "Smart Cafe Cities."
This paper is organized as follows: section 1 is the introduction, section 2 proposes four
percolation channels of human capital externalities, and section 3 discusses the geographic
scope of human capital externalities. Section 4 specifies the econometric models and dis-
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cusses the identification strategies, section 5 introduces the data set, section 6 presents the
estimate results, and section 7 concludes.
2.1 Introduction
A high concentration of skilled workers can promote the creation, diffusion, acquisition, and
accumulation of knowledge across individual workers, geographic space, and time. Workers
benefit from being close to a dense skilled labor market where, through different channels,
they can learn from others without compensation. For example, "if one man starts a
new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus
it becomes the source of new ideas" (Marshall [29], p.271). Such productivity-enhancing
external benefits of labor markets are called human capital externalities, knowledge spillover
effects, learning externalities, or labor market local agglomeration economies, whichever you
choose. Uncompensated externalities from aggregate human capital stock have long been
considered one of the important forces of economic growth (Romer [36], Lucas [26]). Further,
local human capital externalities are considered to be one of the predominant reasons for the
existence of cities (Henderson [21], Fujita and Ogawa [15], Lucas [27]) and urban endogenous
growth (Palivos and Wang [31], Eaton and Eckstein [12], Black and Henderson [6]).
If workers can learn from others nearby, their productivity will increase. Therefore,
firms would be willing to pay higher wages (assuming workers are paid by their marginal
value of product). In order to prevent all workers from concentrating in a particular area,
housing and land rents must increase to achieve spatial equilibrium. Therefore, firm data,
wage data, and housing or land price data can be used to test human capital externalities.
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The disadvantage of using firm data is that it requires a broad set of control variables to
separate other sources of benefit firms obtain from being close to each other, such as natural
advantage, input sharing, and forward or backward linkages. Land prices usually are not
directly observable. Estimating hedonic housing models to infer human capital externalities
is reasonable, but omits information of individual workers. Other indirect methods may be
possible; for example, Jaffe et al. [24] used patent citation data to study the geographical
localization of patent citations. The ideal direct way to identify human capital externalities
is to employ wage data. A good example is the paper by Wheaton and Lewis [43] that
used wage data to test labor market agglomeration across Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs).
Two important questions have not yet been answered in the literature. The first question
IS: what are the microfoundations of knowledge spillovers? Or, put another way, how
do human capital externalities percolate? Though people do exchange information and
ideas and learn from each other by socializing in downtown cafes, unfortunately, we can
not directly observe how knowledge spills out among buildings and across streets. We
hypothesize, by distilling the existing literature, that there exist the similar mechanisms
of agglomeration economies in a dense labor market as those of firms' concentration,l and
interpret the positive effects of local labor market agglomeration on individual earnings
as the evidence of human capital externalities. We propose that workers can learn from
their occupational and industrial peers who are in the same local labor market through four
channels:
1 For a survey of literature on agglomeration economies from the concentration of firms or industries, see
Rosenthal and Strange [39] and Duranton and Puga [11].
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(1) the depth (quality) of human capital stock in the local labor market;
(2) Marshallian labor market externalities, or the specialization and peer competition
effects;
(3) Jacobs labor market externalities, or the diversity of the local labor market in terms
of occupations and industries;
(4) the thickness (density) of local labor market or labor market pooling effects.
The second question is: what is the geographic scope of human capital externalities?
For example, at what geographic level are human capital externalities the strongest and
most significant? How do knowledge spillovers attenuate spatially? Geographical proximity
reduces communication costs and increases the frequency of social interactions. Intuitively,
knowledge spillovers through social interactions are very localized. However, most empirical
papers have used data only at metropolitan (Wheaton and Lewis [43]), city or county
(Timothy and Wheaton [42]), or zip code level (Rosenthal and Strange [38]).
The 1990 Massachusetts census data enable us to explore labor market agglomeration
down to the census tract and block level. We estimate hedonic wage models with different
location fixed effects and identify that almost all types of human capital externalities are
significant across blocks as well as across tracts. Furthermore, Marshallian labor market
externalities and the effect of labor market thickness in terms of industrial employment
density are significant at the block level. We also estimate a spatial attenuation effects
model, and find that different types of human capital externalities attenuate with distance
at different speeds. For example, occupational Marshallian labor market externalities de-
cay rapidly beyond 1.5 miles away from block centroid; the effect of human capital depth
decays rapidly beyond three miles; while Jacobs externalities in terms of industry diversity
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decay very slowly within nine miles, indicating certain degree of urbanization economies.
Since human capital externalities are very localized, we call dense urban areas "Smart Cafe
Cities." 2
2.2 The lllicrofoundations of hUlllan capital externalities
Existing studies have explored either only one or two of the dimensions of knowledge spillover
mechanisms. For example, Jovanovic and Rob [25], Rauch [35], Simon and Nardinelli [41],
and Shapiro [40] studied only the depth of human capital. Wheaton and Lewis [43] tested
Marshallian labor market externalities and the thickness of a labor market. Ciccone and
Hall [8] studied only the density of economic activity. Jacobs labor market externalities
have never been tested in literature. Charlot and Duranton [7] identified that workplace
communication externalities can explain only about one tenth of the effects of city size and
average urban schooling on individual earnings, which hints that there must exist other
channels of knowledge spillovers.
We propose that there are four types of percolation mechanisms of human capital exter-
nalities through local labor markets: depth (quality) of human capital stock, Marshallian
labor market externalities, Jacobs labor market externalities, and thickness of labor markets.
These four channels capture the four dimensions of knowledge: the vertical and horizontal
difference, local specialization, and spatial density of knowledge. They can be considered
as the local labor market attributes that promote human capital accumulation and enhance
workers' productivity.
2The term "Smart Cities" was proposed by Shapiro [40]. "Cafe Cities" was proposed by Professor Richard
Arnott in his lectures on urban economics at Boston College.
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In the following subsections, we define the four types of human capital externalities in
detail and design a set of variables to measure them. Our unique data set enables us to test
these four types of human capital externalities within one model specification.
2.2.1 The depth of human capital stock
We define the degree of advancement or sophistication of a certain type human capital as
the depth or quality of human capital, which reflects the vertical difference of knowledge.
Workers can learn more and faster from others who have better human capital in their
fields than from those with lower human capital level. High-quality human capital can
enhance the ability to absorb existing ideas and create new ones. Therefore, even though
well-educated workers may learn less from less educated neighbors, they still learn much
from the concentration of well-educated peers.
School education is the typical way to deepen human capital; therefore, the average level
of education in a labor market is a good proxy for the depth of human capital stock. We
use a simpler index: the share of workers with college degree, or higher, in a labor market,
since an increase in the share of college graduates in a labor market implies an increase in
the average level of education.3
A comprehensive literature survey on human capital externalities - in terms of the aver-
age level of education - was done by Moretti [30]. The first theoretical model incorporating
human capital depth probably was constructed by Jovanovic and Rob [25]. Their model
shows that knowledge spillovers depend on the vertical differences in what people know.
3Working experience is also a good measurement of human capital depth; but, Rauch [35] found that the
average level of education has a much greater external effect on wages than the average level of experience.
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Rauch [35] provided probably the first empirical test of the effects of human capital depth
on urban wages and land rents. He used the 1980 census data on individual workers in over
200 U.S. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and found that a metropolitan
area with an average educational level one-year higher than another would have about a 3%
productivity advantage. Simon and Nardinelli [41] found that city-aggregate and metropol-
itan areas with a higher percentage of college graduates grew faster over the 20th century in
the U.S .. Shapiro [40] used the 1940, 1970, 1980, and 1990 Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series (IPUMS) databases and concluded that the deepening of human capital contributes
to the growth of urban employment, wages, and housing value. In his overall sample, a
10% increase in the share of college educated residents generated a 0.2%, 0.6%, and 0.7%
increase in wage, urban employment, and housing value growth, respectively. It is in this
sense that he called cities, "Smart."
2.2.2 Marshallian labor market externalities
The original idea of human capital externalities probably first dates back to Alfred Marshall
[29]. Marshall emphasized that human capital externalities take place mostly between
workers in the same industry and city through face-to-face interactions. He also stressed
technological spillovers from one firm to another firm nearby in the same industry in a
city. He defined the benefits a firm obtains from the general development of the industry
as external economies ([29], p.266). It is within this dynamic context, recently, that urban
economists developed the concept, "Marshallian externalities," meaning firms can benefit
from the concentration of same-industry firms in an intertemporal context (Glaser, et aI.,
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[19]).4 Empirical work has identified that Marshallian externalities are significant in many
industries. For example, Henderson [22] found that Marshallian externalities have strong
productivity effects in high-tech industries.
We hypothesize that workers can learn from the local concentration of same-occupation
and same-industry peers. We refer to this "Marshallian labor market externalities." The
mechanism is such that the concentration of specialized skilled workers generates more
competition, which provides a strong motivation for workers to learn the most up-to-date
knowledge and speeds the creation and diffusion of new knowledge. This is the crucial
point of Porter's theory of competitive advantage in regional clusters (Porter, [32], [33]).
Also, increased division of labor generates comparative advantage compared with under-
specialized regions.
We use the degree of occupation (industry) specialization at a location to measure
Marshallian labor market externalities. The occupation (industry) specialization index is
the ratio of the employment in a certain occupation (industry) at a location to the total
employment at that location. This index measures the intensity and frequency of social
interactions and knowledge spillovers among same-occupation (same industry) workers at a
location. Wheaton and Lewis [43] were probably the first to test Marshallian labor market
externalities. They used manufacturing industry wage data from the 5% Public Use Micro
Sample (PUMS) of the 1990 U.S. census, and found that the differences in occupation
4In urban literature, economies external to firms but internal to the industry are dubbed "localization
economies" in static context; in this case, individual firms benefit from the local concentration of same-
industry firms. Economies external to industries but internal to a city are called urbanization economies;
here individual firms benefit from the concentration of different industries in a city. Informally speaking,
dynamic localization economies are called Marshallian or Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities, and dynamic
urbanization economies are called Jacobs externalities. One of the main sources of dynamic externalities is
the accumulation of different types of human capital.
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specialization and industry specialization across MSAs could generate 23% and 30% higher
wages, respectively.
2.2.3 Jacobs labor market externalities
Jacobs [23], with many concrete examples, emphasized that it is the variety and diversity of
geographically proximate industries that promote innovation and city growth. This is why
the benefits from urban diversity in the dynamic context are called, "Jacobs externalities."
Firms benefit from urban diversity due to the following external economies: shared inputs,
lower transaction costs, and statistical economies of scale in production and consumption.
Examples would be business services and consumption amenities, labor market matching
and shopping districts, and unemployment insurance in a diverse labor market (Quigley,
[34], Duranton and Puga, [10]). New economic geography models (Fujita, et aI., [16])
and some endogenous growth models (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, [2], chapter 6) show that
diversity and variety in producer inputs or consumption goods can generate external scale
economIes.
The empirical results of testing Jacobs externalities are mixed. Glaeser et aI. [19] con-
cluded that urban diversity encourages employment growth in industries, while Henderson
[22] found little evidence of Jacobs externalities in the high-tech and machinery industries.
Workers benefit from the diversity of labor markets, which we call, "Jacobs labor market
externalities." One reason is that many inventions are interdisciplinary due to the stimu-
lation of "ideas" in heterogeneous surroundings in cities. Berliant et al. [5] assumed that
individuals possess horizontally differentiated types of knowledge and randomly search for
partners with whom to exchange ideas in order to improve production efficacy. Their model
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shows that the addition of new knowledge through matching results in endogenous growth.
A second reason is that labor market diversity reflects an open and tolerant social and
cultural milieu that attracts different types of talented people to that area. Florida [14]
constructed a bohemia index-the bohemian population at the MSA level and found that
the presence and concentration of bohemians is highly correlated with the concentration
of high human capital individuals and innovative high-tech industries.5 In another paper
(Florida, [13]), he found that the geographic distribution of talent is closely associated with
diversity (meaning low entry barriers) and urban amenities.
We construct an occupation (industry) diversity index that equals one minus the Herfind-
ahl index of occupations (industries). The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared shares of
employment of different occupations (industries) at a location. It is possible that the spatial
concentration of different industries may imply scale economies from forward or backward
linkages, but other indices such as inputs or volume of shipments are a better measurement.
Our diversity indices are based on the number of employees in different occupations and
industries, which measure the broadness and horizontal differences of human capital stock
in a local labor market. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to test the
effect of labor market diversity on individual earnings.
2.2.4 The thickness of labor market
The more densely concentrated a labor market in a limited geographic area, the more luck
workers will have in their random matches, that is, workers benefit from the thickness or
5 Florida's selection of bohemian occupations included: authors; designers, musicians and composers;
actors and directors; craft-artists, painters, sculptors, and artist printmakers; photographers; dancers; artists,
performers, and related workers.
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density of a local labor market. In the literature, labor market pooling (from the viewpoint
of firms) sometimes also means the thickness of labor market, though it is used to explain
both localization and urbanization economies. The importance of labor market thickness
at microgeographic levels is that workers can socialize more frequently and build social
networks more easily to exchange information. Bayer et al. [3] detected that social interac-
tions among block neighbors help workers to build informal hiring networks, which have a
significant impact on a wide range of labor market outcomes.
Employment density, the number of workers per square kilometers, is a simple index for
gauging the thickness of a local labor market. An alterative is an occupation (industry)
concentration index, which is the ratio of employment of an occupation (industry) at a loca-
tion to the total employment of that occupation (industry) over all the locations. However,
the values of concentration indices depend on the specification of geographic units.
In a labor market with imperfect information, firms and workers search for each other to
form an idea match. The larger or more dense a labor market is, the higher the probability
of a better match between jobs and workers with heterogeneous human capital. This labor
market pooling effect can generate agglomeration economies even without learning behavior
(Helsley and Strange, [20]). Ciccone and Hall [8] were the first to put density of economic
activity into theory and empirical test. Their models show that spatial density results in
aggregate increasing returns: a doubling of employment density in a county results in a 6%
increase of average labor productivity. These locally increasing returns can explain more
than half of the variance of output per worker across the United States. Wheaton and Lewis
[43] found that the differences in occupation and industry concentration across MSAs could
generate 12% and 16% higher wages, respectively.
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2.3 The geographic scope of hUlllan capital externalities
The flow of knowledge across geographic space is costly. Information spillovers which require
frequent contact between workers may dissipate over a short distance, since walking to a
meeting place becomes more difficult, or random encounters become more rare, in a far away
and less dense area. But what is the exact spatial scale where human capital externalities
take place? How fast do knowledge spillovers decay spatially? These are empirical questions.
Most empirical works on agglomeration economies have used aggregate data, taking
countries, states, MSAs, cities, or counties as geographic units. Rosenthal and Strange [38]
used zip code level firm data and studied six industries. In most industries, same indus-
try employment encourages the number of births per square mile and new establishment
employment per square mile. They interpreted this as evidence of significant localization
economies. They found that localization economies attenuate with distance: the initial at-
tenuation is rapid, with the effect of own-industry employment in the first mile away from
zip code centroid up to 10 to 1000 times larger than the effect two to fiye miles away; beyond
five miles, attenuation is much slower. Duranton and Overman [9] also found that business
agglomeration effects are very localized (at zip code level) and decay fast with distance.
As for knowledge spillovers, Lucas [26] argued that metropolitan areas are the most
appropriate units to examine when looking for the productivity-enhancing effects of human
capital abundance. Rauch [35] found evidence on human capital externalities at the SMSA
level. Simon and Nardinelli [41] argued that knowledge spillovers are geographically limited
to the city and much knowledge is most productive in the city within which it is acquired.
They found that the estimated effects of human capital on employment growth are very
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large at the city-aggregate level, but smaller on metropolitan areas. Wheaton and Lewis [43]
tested Marshallian externalities and the effect of local labor market thickness at the MSA
or Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (CMSA) level. Beeson et al. [4] identified
human capital infrastructure as a determinant of population growth at the county level over
the period 1840-1990.
No work has been done to identify the microgeographic scope of human capital exter-
nalities. 6 In this paper, we make a contribution to this unexplored topic. We construct
labor market attribute indices at the census tract, blockgroup, and block level, and esti-
mate hedonic wage models with different location fixed effects. We find that all of the
proposed four types of human capital externalities are strong and significant across tracts
and even across blocks. Marshallian labor market externalities and the effect of industry
employment density are significant at the block level. We also find that the effects of human
capital externalities attenuate at different speeds with distance away from block centroid.
It is in this sense that we call cities, "Cafe Cities."
2.4 Model specification and identification
In this section we specify two types of models and discuss the identification strategies. The
first is a benchmark model for testing the magnitude and significance of the types of human
capital externalities at different spatial scales. The second is constructed to detect the
spatial decay patterns of those externalities.
6Literature on "neighborhood effects" studied social interactions at different geographical levels. Bayer
et al. [3] detected social interaction (informal hiring referral) between workers at the census block level.
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2.4.1 The benchmark model
The benchmark model is specified as an augmented hedonic wage model including both
individual characteristics and local labor market attributes. The labor market attribute
indices are constructed at the census tract level.
log Wnoij == a + Ac + (3' X n + ~/Xj + Enoij, (1)
whereWnoij is the hourly wage of worker n, whose occupation is 0 and who worked in
industry i at census tract j, a is a constant, Ac is county fixed effects, X n is the characteristics
vector of worker n, Xj is the attributes vector of local labor market at census tract j, (3
and 'Yare the coefficient vectors to be estimated, and Enoij is the error term. 7
Variables of individual characteristics include age, age square (proxy for working experi-
ence), dummy variables for gender, marriage, race, education, English proficiency, student,
veteran, and working disability. Industry and occupation dummies are also included to con-
trol for industry and occupation specific effects. Since commuting costs must be capitalized
into wages if firms are located at different points within a metropolitan area, we also include
commuting time (minutes) to the workplace in the model.
Local labor market attributes include indices for human capital depth of local labor
market and of each occupation and industry, occupation specialization, occupation diversity,
occupation employment density, industry specialization, industry diversity, and industry
employment density. Variables for these indices are constructed as follows:
7 Census tracts are nested within counties. The Boston Metropolitan Area (BMA) includes all of Suffolk
county, and portions of six other counties: Bristol, Essex, Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Worcester
county.
54
AveEdu: percentage of college or higher degree-holders among all the workers at tract
j, representing the overall depth of human capital stock at tract j.
AveEduOcc: percentage of college or higher degree-holders among all the workers of
occupation 0 at tract j, representing the depth of human capital stock for occupation 0
employment at tract j.
AveEduInd: percentage of college or higher degree-holders among all the workers in in-
dustry i at tract j, representing the depth of human capital stock for industry i employment
at tract j.
OccSpec: occupation specialization index for workers of occupation 0 at tract j. It is
the ratio of the number of workers of occupation 0 at tract j to the total number of workers
at that tract, used to proxy for Marshallian labor market externalities among occupational
peers.
OccDiver: occupation diversity index for workers at tract j. It equals one minus the
Herfindahl index, representing Jacobs labor market externalities in terms of occupation
diversity. Let SOj denote the ratio of occupation 0 employment at' tract j to the total
employment at tract j. Define the occupation diversity index as
OccDiver == 1 - 2: S~j .
o
Note that if there is only one occupation in a tract, the Herfindahl index equals 1, and
the diversity index equals 0; if there are many occupations in a tract, and the share of
employment in each occupation is very small, then the Herfindahl index is close to 0, and
the occupation diversity index becomes close to 1. The larger the value of the occupation
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diversity index, the more diverse the local labor market is, in term of occupations.
OeeDens: occupation employment density index for workers of occupation 0 at tract j.
It equals the number of workers of occupation 0 per square kilometer at tract j, and is used
to measure the thickness of a local labor market in terms of occupation 0 employment. We
do not use the occupation concentration index as Wheaton and Lewis [43] did because it is
not geographically invariant.
The same methods are applied to the construction of industry indices. For example: the
industry specialization index would be
I dS
number of workers in industry i at tract j
n pee = .
total employment at tract j
The industry diversity index
IndDiver = 1 - " S~·L..-t tJ'
where Sij denotes the ratio of employment in industry i at tract j to the total employment
at tract j.
I ndDens: industry employment density index for workers in industry i at tract j. It is
the number of industry i workers per square kilometer at tract j.
We estimate model (1) by pooling all the data, and by occupation and industry. The
results are reported in sections 6.1 and 6.2.
2.4.2 Identification strategies
The error term captures the effects of unobservable locational attributes, unobservable
individual characteristics, and measurement errors. Most likely the error terms are spatially
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correlated and are not identically and independently distributed. In this subsection we
discuss how to deal with these problems.
A location may have better accessibility, or other natural or historical advantages, which
are omitted in model (1). We use location fixed effects to capture the omitted locational
attributes. For example, in model (1) the county fixed effects control for county specific
attributes; therefore, we can identify the significance of all types of human capital external-
ities within a county or across tracts. However, unobservable tract specific attributes may
affect our estimation. To identify what types of human capital externalities are significant
within tracts, we estimate model (1) with tract fixed effects, but we have to drop variables
AveEdu, OccDiver, and IndDiver, since they are invariant within each tract. By the same
token, to identify what types of human capital externalities are significant across (within)
census blocks, we construct the labor market attribute indices at the census block level, and
estimate a model with blockgroup (block) fixed effects.
Workers may have unobservable characteristics or intrinsic preferences, which correlate
with the independent variables in model (1). For example, workers with high-level human
capital may strongly prefer to work in a place where well-educated workers concentrate, even
though no learning externalities occur (though this is highly impossible). This sorting effect
causes the correlation between the error terms and some labor market attribute indices.
Therefore, the omitted individual characteristic variables will make the coefficients of some
labor market attributes overestimated. One way to deal with such kind of sorting problem
is to use instrumental variables estimation. For example, Rosenthal and Strange (2005)
employed several geological variables as instruments for agglomeration measures. However,
in our data we know of no such variables which are correlated with local labor market
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attributes but not with the error terms. Another way is to use time-invariant individual
fixed effects to capture all the unobservable individual characteristics (Glaeser and Mare,
2001). This requires a panel data set. Since we only have a cross-section data set, we leave
this endogeneity problem for future research.
Locations nearby may share some common attributes, such as infrastructures, economic
policy, and complementary industries. This causes spatial autocorrelation between error
terms. Within each location, error terms may not be identically and independently dis-
tributed. We address this issue in two ways. First we use location fixed effects to control
for the correlation between locations; second, to deal with heteroscedasticity and autocor-
relation within each location, we use the Huber/White estimate of variance clustered by
locations to produce consistent standard errors. 8 However, there is no theoretical guarantee
to believe that the locations classified by the Census Bureau are the perfect controls. The
better alternative may be to use non-parametric or semi-parametric estimates, or spatial
econometric methods by using spatial weights (Gibbson and Machin [18], Anselin, [1]). We
leave this on the future agenda.
No matter how carefully designed and implemented, the census data still contain mea-
surement errors, such as undercount. The measurement error problem will be magnified
when using data at lower geographic levels, but less serious at aggregate levels or loca-
tions with large observations. Measurement errors in dependent variables will cause the
coefficients to be underestimated. We will take this into account when we interpret esti-
mate results from lower geographical models. We also estimate models by selecting locations
8We use the STATA command "areg" with option "cluster", which allows that the residuals are not
identically distributed and are not independent within clusters.
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where the number of workers is greater than a certain number to get a sense of measurement
errors.
Some indices are moderately correlated (See Table A-5 in the appendix), which hints
that our proposed human capital externalities percolation channels may interact with each
other. For example, high diversity may attract highly-educated workers; high occupation
diversity may imply low specialization for some occupations; a high degree of specialization
of some occupations in downtown may also imply high occupation employment density.
However, in this study we do not consider the interaction problem since we are particularly
interested in identifying the different dimensions of human capital externalities. Our huge
sample size can reduce the standard errors and partly remedy the collinearity problem.
2.4.3 The spatial attenuation model
To test how human capital externalities attenuate with distance, we adopt the methodology
proposed by Rosenthal and Strange [38]. For each block, we construct concentric rings of
various radii away from the centroid of that block; for every ring, we construct the seven
indices of labor market attributes, respectively, based on the employment in that ring. 9 We
then estimate model (1) by including all the indices of all the rings.
Given that the census data provide individual residential and working address infor-
mation only down to block level, we cannot precisely compute distances between any two
workers. To compute the distance between any two block centroids, we assume that all
employment in a block concentrates at the centroid of that block. If a block centroid is
9Here we only use AveEdu to measure human capital depth. The inclusion of AveEduOcc and
AveEduInd does not change results much, but makes the presentation harder since we already have too
many variables.
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within a particular ring, then the whole area of that block is considered in that ring, too.
The alternative is to assume that employment is uniformly distributed at each block,
then construct rings of certain miles away from block centroid. In order to infer the propor-
tion of employment from each overlapped block in a ring, Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) software is needed to compute areas of all the parts of blocks that overlap with that
ring. However, in our sample, each worker has a set of heterogeneous characteristics in
terms of education, race, occupation, and industry. Even if we assume that workers are
uniformly distributed within blocks, we still cannot guarantee that workers of a certain
characteristic are also uniformly distributed. Therefore, it is impossible to construct all
indices for each ring in a consistent way. Rosenthal and Strange [38] adopted the uniform
distribution assumption because their variables were not individual specific. Compared to
metropolitan areas, it does not make much difference whether one assumes that workers are
uniformly distributed within a block or concentrate at block centroid. 10
The results of the spatial attenuation model are reported in section 6.3.
2.5 Data
We use the restricted version of the 1990 Massachusetts census data. The data set contains
detailed information on surveyed individuals' personal characteristics, family structure, ge-
ographic information of residential and working place, and housing characteristics. The
sample used in this paper is constructed as follows: select workers ages 16-65, working in
the Boston metropolitan area, who reported non-zero wages, hours usually worked per week,
10 Actually, Rosenthal and Strange also estimated their models by assuming employment concentrate at
the centroid of each zip code area. The results are very similar.
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and weeks worked in the previous year. We exclude workers whose industry was agriculture,
mining, military, or not classified, and also exclude workers who have disabilities preventing
them from working. For the tract level model, we select only tracts where the number of
workers is greater than 1.1 1 We apply the same rule for blockgroup and block level models.
The tract level model sample includes 150,952 observations, 7 counties, 621 census tracts,
2,461 blockgroups, and 11,395 blocks. Some summary statistics are listed in Table A-I in
the appendix. Tables A-2 and A-3 list the industries and occupations we classify in this
paper. Table A-4 presents the mean and standard deviations across tracts for all the tract-
level labor market attribute indices for some selected occupations and industries. Table A-5
presents the correlation matrix for all the labor market attribute indices.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Benchmark model results
We first estimate model (1) with county and tract fixed effects. The results are reported in
Table 1.
11 If there is only one worker in a location, there is no social interaction in that local labor market. We
also estimate models including those locations and the results are very similar.
61
TABLE 1
Benchmark Model at the Tract Level
Fixed effects regression with clustered standard errors
Dependent Variable: log(imputed hourly wage); total observations: 150952
County fixed effects Tract fixed effects
{-0.0099} 0.0083
0.0419 0.0095
0.0191
0.0167
0.0504
0.0178
0.0496
{0.0251}
0.2025
0.0523
Independent Variable Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
Constant 0.9903 0.1285 1.4917 0.0392
Single dummy -0.2015 0.0046 -0.2003 0.0054
Female dummy -0.2140 0.0276 -0.2106 0.0109
Single*female 0.2283 0.0169 0.2266 0.0062
Age 0.0508 0.0021 0.0506 0.0013
Age2 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0000
White dummy 0.1805 0.0129 0.1815 0.0084
White*female -0.1213 0.0034 -0.1230 0.0100
Student dummy -0.0745 0.0057 -0.0718 0.0068
Veteran dummy 0.0600 0.0156 0.0600 0.0057
Disability dummy -0.1480 0.0028 -0.1469 0.0101
College dummy 0.1429 0.0028 0.1441 0.0038
Graduate dummy 0.2807 0.0032 0.2825 0.0097
English proficiency dummy -0.0480 0.0021 -0.0448 0.0057
Commuting time 0.0017 0.0001 0.0016 0.0001
Average education (%) 0.1535 0.0149
Av. Edu. occupation (%) 0.0474 0.0183
Av. Edu. industry (%) 0.0399 0.0189
Occ. specialization (%) 0.1697 0.0231
Ind. specialization (%) 0.0643 0.0103
Occ. diversity (%) 0.2986 0.1107
Ind. diversity (%) 0.2116 0.0201
Occ. employment density {0.0035} 0.0022
Ind. employment density 0.0374 0.0054
R 2 0.326
S.E. clusters county(7)
0.333
tract (621)
Note:{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
Occupation and industry dummies are included.
In Table 1, the county fixed effects model shows that estimated coefficients for all the
variables of individual characteristics and local labor market attributes are significant at the
5% level except that the coefficient of occupation employment density index is significant
at the 10% level. The effects of human capital depth at the tract level are decomposed into
three components: the depth of overall, same-occupation, and same-industry human capital
stock. The coefficient of AveEdu shows that a 1% increase in the share of workers who
are college graduates in a tract increases workers' hourly wage at that tract on average by
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0.15%; a one standard deviation of AveEdu (0.126) generates wage growth effects of 1.89%
across tracts. The effects of human capital depth of occupational and industrial peers are
smaller, the elasticity is about 0.05 and 0.04.
The Marshallian labor market externalities reflected by the occupation specialization
index are stronger than the effects of overall human capital depth, the elasticity is about
0.17. The Jacobs externalities, indicated by the occupation and industry diversity variables,
are strong. One standard deviation increase in occupation diversity (0.057) across tracts
generates a 1.71% increase in hourly wages; a one standard deviation in industry diversity
(0.105) generates 2.21% higher hourly wages. The effect of labor market thickness in terms
of industrial employment density is very strong, adding one more same-industry worker to
a square kilometer area at a tract generates 3.7% wage growth. Note that we controlled
for individual characteristics, county, industry, and occupation specific effects; our results
reflect the very general effects of human capital externalities across heterogeneous workers
within a county.
To test the stability of the model specification, we also estimate a series of models slightly
different from the benchmark model. For example, drop the occupation dummies, industry
dummies, or diversity indices, and select only workers in non-government sectors, and select
only tracts where the number of workers is greater than 100 or 200. The coefficients are
somewhat different, but, the overall patterns are pretty similar (results are not reported
here). The presented model is our preferred specification.
The county fixed effects model shows that, within a county, all the types of labor market
externalities (except occupation employment density) are significant at the 5% level. To
identify what types of externalities are significant at the tract level, we drop AveEdu and
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diversity indices and estimate a tract fixed effects model. The results in Table 1 show that
the quality of human capital in an occupation, Marshallian labor market externalities, and
industry employment density are significant at the tract level.
To identify what types of human capital externalities are significant at lower geographical
levels, we construct the labor market attribute indices at the blockgroup and block level.
For example, in the block level model, the overall depth of human capital is the percentage
of workers who are college graduates at a block; the occupation specialization index is the
ratio of same-occupation workers at a block to the total number of workers at that block.
We then estimate the benchmark model at the blockgroup and block level with different
locational fixed effects respectively. Tables 2 and 3 present the results for blockgroup and
block level models, where only the labor market attribute indices are listed.
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TABLE 2
Benchmark Model at the Blockgroup Level
Fixed effects County Tract
Variable Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std. error
Blockgroup
Coefficient Std.error
AveEdu 0.1174 0.0157 {0.OO53} 0.0278
AveEduOcc {0.0222} 0.0159 0.0252 0.0130
AveEdulnd 0.0224 0.0076 {0.0127} 0.0121
OccSpec 0.1142 0.0428 0.1385 0.0333
IndSpec 0.0642 0.0086 0.0563 0.0146
OccDiver 0.1843 0.0442 0.2004 0.0669
IndDiver 0.1390 0.0136 {0.0264} 0.0279
OccDens 0.0062 0.0024 {-0.0070} 0.0070
IndDens 0.0159 0.0039 0.0186 0.0040
0.0245
{0.0099}
0.1452
0.0554
-0.0089
0.0183
0.0124
0.0121
0.0312
0.0160
0.0041
0.0059
R2 0.326 0.333
S.E. clusters County (7) Tract (620)
Note:{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
All indices are constructed at the blockgroup level.
0.345
Blockgroup (2351)
In Table 2, the blockgroup fixed effects model identifies the types of externalities that
are significant within a blockgroup, including the quality of human capital among same-
occupation peers, Marshallian labor market externalities, and the thickness of the labor
market.
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Fixed effects
Variable
TABLE 3
Benchmark Model at the Block Level
County Tract Blockgroup
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Block
Coefficient
{0.0063}
0.0095
{-0.0108}
0.0097
0.0891
0.0206
0.0590
0.0120
AveEdu
AveEduOcc
AveEduInd
OccSpec
IndSpec
OccDiver
IndDiver
OccDens
IndDens
0.0889 0.0414 0.0383
0.0059 0.0160 0.0180
{0.0114} {0.0127} {0.0125}
0.0101 0.0091 0.0091
{-0.0026} {-0.0102} {-0.0117}
0.0057 0.0086 0.0092
0.0545 0.0643 0.0661
0.0197 0.0194 0.0196
0.0670 0.0603 0.0614
0.0068 0.0120 0.0124
0.1428 0.1462 0.1451
0.0205 0.0319 0.0317
0.0860 0.0372 0.0442
0.0174 0.0175 0.0190
0.0064 0.0039 0.0036 {0.0017}
0.0001 0.0011 0.0016 0.0016
0.0026 0.0031 0.0028 0.0024
0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011
R'2 0.330 0.337 0.349 0.385
S.E. clusters County (7) Tract (618) Blockgroup (2247) Block (7779)
Note: {} indicates insignificance at the 5% level. Standard errors are in the
rows below the coefficients. All indices are constructed at the block level.
In Table 3, the blockgroup fixed effects model shows that almost all types of human
capital externalities are significant across blocks. The block fixed effects model further
identifies that Marshallian labor market externalities and labor market thickness in terms
of industrial employment are significant at the block level.
Table 4 further summarizes different types of human capital externalities that are sig-
nificant at the 5% percent level at different geographic scopes.
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TABLE 4
Different Types of Externalities Significant at Different Geographic Levels
Across Within Across Within Across Within
Tracts Tract Blockgroups Blockgroup Blocks Block
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
yy
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y y
y y y y
y
y
y
y
y
AveEdu
AveEduOcc
AveEdulnd
OccSpec
IndSpec
OccDiver
IndDiver
OccDens
IndDens
Note: "Y" indicates significance at the 5% level.
The most striking result in Table 4 is that the Marshallian labor market externalities
are significant at all microgeographic levels, including at the block level. Almost all types
of externalities are significant across blocks, as well as across tracts. It is in this sense that
we call cities, "Cafe Cities."
In Table 5, we assemble the results from the benchmark model at the tract, blockgroup,
and block levels, where only county fixed effects are included.
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TABLE 5
Benchmark Model at Different Microgeographic Levels
Tract level Blockgroup Level Block Level
N > 1 N > 1 N > 1 N > 10
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
AveEdu 0.1535 0.1174 0.0889 0.1371
AveEduOcc 0.0474 {0.0222} {0.0114} 0.0256
AveEduInd 0.0399 0.0224 {-0.0026} 0.0186
OccSpec 0.1697 0.1142 0.0545 0.0880
IndSpec 0.0643 0.0642 0.0670 0.0612
OccDiver 0.2986 0.1843 0.1428 {0.0246}
IndDiver 0.2116 0.1390 0.0860 0.1041
OccDens {0.0035} 0.0062 0.0064 0.0054
IndDens 0.0374 0.0159 0.0026 0.0023
Note: { } indicates insignificance at the 5% level. All models include
county fixed effects. N is the number of workers at a location.
Table 5 shows some interesting spatial patterns of human capital externalities. The co-
efficients of occupation employment density are increasing when moved down to the lower
geographic levels, which hints that they decay with distance away from a block. The coef-
ficients of industrial Marshallian externalities are very similar, which hints that they decay
very slowly within a tract. All other indices have the same pattern: much stronger at the
tract level, much smaller at the block level. The explanation could be as follows: these
externalities are strong at the tract level, but measurement errors attenuate the coefficients
at the blockgroup and block level. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the block level model
by selecting only blocks where the number of workers is greater than 10. The results show
that most of the coefficients, indeed, increase significantly. Tentatively, we conclude that,
without measurement errors, the coefficients of human capital depth, occupation special-
ization, diversity indices, and industry employment density would be similar at the tract,
blockgroup, and block level.
The above rough spatial patterns indicate that different types of human capital exter-
nalities take place at different geographic scopes, and attenuate spatially at different speeds.
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However, we cannot see the pattern beyond the tract level. The natural extension is to test
the spatial decay patterns of different types of human capital externalities within a larger
geographic scope.
2.6.2 Human capital externalities by occupation and industry
We also estimate model (1) by occupation and industry to explore the human capital ex-
ternalities within a labor market of a particular occupation or industry at the tract level.
Table 6 presents the results for a few selected occupations and industries.
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TABLE 6
Benchmark Model by Industry and Occupation
High-tech Computer Manufacturing
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std. error
AveEdu
AveEduOcc
AveEduInd
OccSpec
IndSpec
OccDiver
IndDiver
OccDens
IndDens
Observations
R2
0.3351 0.0890 0.3258 0.1663 0.2901 0.0562
{-0.0289} 0.0577 0.0786 0.0176 {0.0270} 0.0282
{0.0527} 0.0469 {0.0125} 0.0860 {0.0107} 0.0652
0.3996 0.0914 {0.0341} 0.0933 {0.1664} 0.0870
0.1527 0.0161 0.5942 0.2181 0.2243 0.0555
{0.1122} 0.2924 {0.6238} 0.7001 {0.2649} 0.3615
0.1345 0.0474 0.2644 0.0999 0.1470 0.0463
{-0.0245} 0.0654 -0.0418 0.0150 -0.0229 0.0094
{-0.0370} 0.1104 {-0.0642} 0.1530 {0.1019} 0.0597
6251 2139 21861
0.449 0.312 0.404
Writers,artists Mathematical Managerial
entertainers, athletes computer scientists professional specialty
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
AveEdu 0.4819 0.0832 {0.0029} 0.1338 {0.0939} 0.0779
AveEduOcc {0.0377} 0.0601 0.1560 0.0606 0.0973 0.0143
AveEduInd {-0.0967} 0.2279 {0.1427} 0.1221 0.0619 0.0258
OccSpec {-0.0826} 0.3485 1.6416 0.2682 0.3491 0.0901
IndSpec {0.2933} 0.1922 {0.0385} 0.0624 0.0907 0.0343
OccDiver 1.6508 0.3804 {0.2300} 0.3002 {-0.0021} 0.1950
IndDiver 0.4721 0.1708 0.2166 0.0400 0.2524 0.0673
OccDens 0.3441 0.0955 {0.4985} 0.3254 0.0086 0.0032
IndDens {0.0140} 0.0232 -0.0704 0.0219 0.0381 0.0065
Observations 3400 2177 26287
R2 0.172 0.223 0.292
Note: { } indicates insignificance at the 5% level. Individual variables, occupation or industry
dummies, and county fixed effects are included.
Table 6 shows that high-tech industry workers benefit strongly from Marshallian labor
market externalities, which is consistent with Henderson's finding based on plant level data.
Manufacturing industry workers benefit from both Marshallian and Jacobs externalities,
which is consistent with the literature on dynamic externalities. The same pattern holds
for computer industry workers. Management occupation workers benefit from all of the
four types of human capital externalities by different degrees. Computer scientists benefit
strongly from same-occupation peers and industrial diversity. Artists strongly benefit from
urban diversity, which is very consistent with Florida's argument based on his bohemian
index. In brief, channels of knowledge spillovers vary in sub-labor markets of different
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occupations and industries.
2.6.3 Spatial attenuation model results
We construct all the labor market attribute indices in such a way that they do not depend
on geographic units. If economic activities were evenly distributed over space and if there
were no spatial attenuation, the effects of human capital externalities would be the same
at different locations. If estimated coefficients for an index vary with distance, we can infer
its spatial pattern. We divide rings of different miles away from the centroid of each block
and construct indices based on the workers in each ring. There is no prior guidance on how
to determine the number and the width of rings, except through experimentation. A rule
of thumb is to look at the size distribution of blocks, blockgroups, and tracts. For all the
tracts, blockgroups, and blocks in BMA, if we assume they were circles, then about 95% of
blocks are within circles of 0.3 mile radius, 95% blockgroups are within circles of 1.3 miles
radius, and 98% tracts are within circles of 3 miles radius. However, the size distributions
of blocks, blockgroups, and tracts are very dispersed. We first, tentatively, draw rings of
1.5, 3, 6, and 9 miles away from each block centroid. Blocks themselves consist of the inner
ring, blocks within distance (0, 1.5] miles consist of the second ring, which corresponds
approximately to the blockgroup level. Blocks within distance (1.5, 3] miles belong to the
third ring, corresponding to the tract level; (3,6] and (6,9] miles annulus are the fourth and
fifth ring. We estimate the spatial attenuation model including all the indices for all the
rings. The results are reported in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
Spatial Attenuation Model (5 Rings)
Modell: N > 1 Model 2: N > 10 Model 3: N > 20
Variable Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std.error
AveEduO 0.0708 0.0120 0.1496 0.0067 0.1736 0.0076
AveEdu1 0.1406 0.0453 0.1081 0.0476 (0.0667) 0.0556
AveEdu3 0.1034 0.0584 (0.0621) 0.0740 (0.1012) 0.0794
AveEdu6 (0.0214) 0.0567 (0.0603) 0.0733 (0.0213) 0.0789
AveEdu9 (0.0662) 0.0584 (-0.0062) 0.0494 (0.0140) 0.0686
OccSpecO 0.0535 0.0213 0.0874 0.0259 0.0816 0.0462
OccSpec1 0.2227 0.0850 0.1924 0.0835 0.2475 0.0844
OccSpec3 -0.3597 0.1912 -0.3837 0.2356 -0.4632 0.2463
OccSpec6 (-0.0298) 0.1417 (-0.0954) 0.1456 (-0.0066) 0.0774
OccSpec9 (0.2900) 0.2619 (0.3862) 0.3138 (0.3168) 0.2807
IndSpecO 0.0602 0.0075 0.0555 0.0061 0.0626 0.0096
IndSpec1 (-0.0039) 0.0102 (0.0036) 0.0087 (-0.0111) 0.0126
IndSpec3 0.0948 0.0537 0.0989 0.0558 0.1028 0.0565
IndSpec6 0.1773 0.0715 0.1840 0.0967 0.2067 0.0871
IndSpec9 (-0.0296) 0.0494 (-0.0039) 0.0394 (0.0179) 0.0448
OccDiverO 0.1438 0.0271 (0.0384) 0.0496 (-0.0063) 0.0368
OccDiver1 (0.0859) 0.1484 (0.2061) 0.1820 (0.1313) 0.2246
OccDiver3 -0.3742 0.2288 (-0.3393) 0.2898 (-0.2665) 0.3125
OccDiver6 (0.1223) 0.9250 (0.0040) 0.9687 (0.1841) 1.1019
OccDiver9 1.1618 0.4064 0.9068 0.3867 0.8317 0.4675
IndDiverO 0.0637 0.0162 0.0810 0.0244 0.0992 0.0192
IndDiver1 0.2735 0.0813 0.2944 0.0934 0.2896 0.1059
IndDiver3 0.2203 0.0906 0.2160 0.1051 0.2364 0.1175
IndDiver6 0.3004 0.1211 0.2755 0.0943 0.3075 0.1477
IndDiver9 (0.1862) 0.01486 (0.1205) 0.1123 (0.1797) 0.1491
OccDensO 0.0064 0.0002 0.0053 0.0001 0.0051 0.0004
OccDens1 -0.0569 0.0065 -0.0510 0.0096 -0.0484 0.0106
OccDens3 0.0784 0.0301 0.1621 0.0290 0.1382 0.0268
OccDens6 (-0.0973) 0.1672 (-0.2069) 0.1497 -0.2116 0.1208
OccDesn9 (-0.0918) 0.3432 (-0.0091) 0.2312 (0.1943) 0.2654
IndDensO 0.0020 0.0006 0.0021 0.0006 0.0018 0.0006
IndDens1 0.0675 0.0190 0.0542 0.0174 0.0411 0.0205
IndDens3 -0.2428 0.0567 -0.2747 0.0619 -0.2678 0.0739
IndDens6 (-0.0105) 0.0432 (0.0210) 0.0565 (0.0278) 0.0761
IndDens9 (0.0153) 0.1106 (-0.0837) 0.0924 -0.2644 0.1203
Observations 145230 123211 107847
R2 0.332 0.345 0.354
Note: ( ) indicates insignificance at the 10% level. Standard error clusters: 7 counties.
N : number of workers in a block.
Numbers 0, 1, 3, 6, 9 at the end of each variable name indicate that the construction
of that variable is based on the employment within the block, ring of 1.5, 3, 6, and 9 miles
respectively. Modell in Table 7 selects only blocks where the number of workers is greater
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than one. Let us first look at the overall quality of human capital. The variable AveEdu
is geographic-invariant. If there were no spatial attenuation, the coefficients should be the
same at different rings. The coefficients of AveEdu are actually .071, .141, .103, .021,
and .066, respectively from the inner ring to the 9 miles ring. The first two coefficients
are significant at the 1% level, the third one is significant at the 10% level, but the other
two coefficients are not significant. The coefficient at the block level (.071) probably is
underestimated due to measurement errors. Though we do not know how strong the actual
effect is at the block level, we could infer that the effects of human capital depth are positive
and significant up to three miles away from each block. then they decay rapidly thereafter
(decrease by 5 times from the third to the fourth ring). This pattern is also consistent with
Table 5.
The effect of occupation specialization decays very fast beyond 1.5 miles, which implies
that the occupational Marshallian externalities are very localized. The industrial special-
ization effects are significant up to the sixth mile, and not significant thereafter, consistent
with Table 5 where industrial specialization effects are very stable within tract levels.
The coefficients of occupation employment density are large and significant at the tract
level, insignificant beyond tract level. The coefficients of industry employment density show
a similar pattern: large and significant at the blockgroup level, then they decay rapidly.
The pattern of diversity indices is worth noting. The coefficients of occupation diversity
are the strongest and significant at the farthest ring. The coefficients of industrial diversity
are positive and significant at the first four rings, and the variation of magnitude is not
very large (.064, .274, .220, .300 in the first four rings). These patterns hint that there exist
strong urbanization economies within certain geographic scopes due to urban diversity.
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The above results show that human capital externalities in cities have obvious spatial
attenuation patterns, though they may be strong at different geographic scopes and decay
at different speeds. Note that the monocentric city model predicts that spatial decay effects
occur with distance away from the Central Business District (CBD). However, in our model,
we construct rings for each block, no matter whether the block is located in downtown or in
a suburban area. Therefore, our results provide much stronger and more powerful evidence
for the spatial attenuation of local agglomeration economies.
Are our results sensitive to the scale of block employment concentration? We also
estimate the same model using blocks where there are more than 10 workers and 20 workers,
respectively, see model 2 and 3 in Table 7. Again we find that the coefficients at the block
level (the inner ring) increase significantly, probably due to measurement errors. Though
the magnitude of the coefficients changed, the spatial decay patterns are almost the same.
We also estimate the spatial attenuation model with tract and blockgroup fixed effects.
The results are presented in Table 8.
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TABLE 8
Spatial Attenuation Model With Different Fixed Effects
Fixed effects Tract Blockgroup
Coefficient Std.error Coefficient Std. error
AveEduO 0.0392 0.0152 0.0296 0.0172
AveEdu1 (-0.1278) 0.0868 -0.3624 0.1396
AveEdu3 (0.0637) 0.1266 (-0.0449) 0.1573
AveEdu6 (-0.0725) 0.1965 (-0.0221) 0.3237
AveEdu9 (-0.0511) 0.2193 (0.0878) 0.3345
OccSpecO 0.0578 0.0196 0.0603 0.0201
OccSpec1 0.2207 0.0792 0.2003 0.0753
OccSpec3 -0.3491 0.1385 -0.3519 0.1138
OccSpec6 (-0.0915) 0.1768 (-0.1265) 0.1647
OccSpec9 0.3527 0.1610 0.3688 0.1600
IndSpecO 0.0536 0.0124 0.0565 0.0127
IndSpec1 (-0.0029) 0.0253 (-0.0172) 0.0268
IndSpec3 0.0826 0.0430 0.0871 0.0396
IndSpec6 0.1139 0.0632 0.1493 0.0612
IndSpec9 (0.0400) 0.0699 (0.0140) 0.0675
OccDiverO 0.1351 0.0317 0.1398 0.0319
OccDiver1 -0.5065 0.2589 (0.2214) 0.3480
OccDiver3 -0.7117 0.3110 (-0.4354) 0.6218
OccDiver6 (0.1882) 1.215 (1.0808) 1.7819
OccDiver9 (0.6878) 1.3032 (1.7476) 1.7778
IndDiverO 0.0325 0.0175 0.0416 0.0192
IndDiver1 (0.0616) 0.1057 (0.1576) 0.1400
IndDiver3 (0.1256) 0.1635 (0.0637) 0.2294
IndDiver6 (-0.2208) 0.4160 (-0.6970) 0.5972
IndDiver9 (0.3289) 0.4221 (0.6386) 0.6021
OccDensO 0.0046 0.0014 0.0043 0.0017
OccDens1 (-0.0500) 0.0344 (-0.0452) 0.0334
OccDens3 (0.0924) 0.1150 (0.0643) 0.0997
OccDens6 (0.0118) 0.2232 (0.0422) 0.1988
OccDens9 (-0.2439) 0.2793 (-0.1506) 0.2800
IndDensO 0.0025 0.0009 0.0022 0.0010
IndDens1 0.0790 0.0276 0.0738 0.0289
IndDens3 -0.1935 0.0740 -0.2129 0.0700
IndDens6 (0.0690) 0.1504 (0.1151) 0.1334
IndDens9 (-0.1695) 0.2179 (-0.1328) 0.2114
R2 0.338 0.350
S.E. clusters Tract (610) Blockgroup (2226)
Note: ( ) indicates insignificance at the 10% level. Observations: 142530.
After controlling for tract or blockgroup specific effects, most coefficients are positive
and significant only at the first and/or the second ring (block and/or blockgroup level),
which makes the spatial attenuation pattern less neat. This, however, further confirms
our identification strategy that the tract fixed effects model identifies agglomeration effects
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across blockgroups and the blockgroup fixed effects model identifies agglomeration effects
across blocks.
Are our results sensitive to the number and width of rings? We also estimate the spatial
decay model by dividing 5 rings of 2 miles intervals and 6 rings of 1 or 2 miles intervals.
The results (not reported here) are pretty similar. We also estimate the spatial attenuation
model by industry and occupation. The results (not reported here) are mixed since human
capital externalities vary across occupations and industries.
2.7 Conclusion
Endogenous growth and urban theories assume the existence of human capital externalities.
Urban theoretical models further predict that agglomeration forces attenuate spatially. In
this paper, we use the 1990 Massachusetts census data and provide empirical evidence for
the microfoundations and spatial attenuation patterns of knowledge spillovers at microgeo-
graphic levels. We test four channels through which individual workers can learn from their
occupational and industrial peers in the same local labor market: depth of the human cap-
ital stock, Marshallian labor market externalities, Jacobs labor market externalities, and
thickness of the local labor market. We find that all types of human capital externalities
are significant across census tracts and blocks; Marshallian labor market externalities and
the effect of labor market thickness in terms of industry employment density are significant
at the block level. The mechanisms of knowledge spillovers vary from industries and occu-
pations. Different types of externalities decay at different speeds over geographic distances.
We conclude that knowledge spillovers are very localized within microgeographic scope in
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cities that we call, "Smart Cafe Cities."
Some related questions may warrant further research. Though we use Marshallian and
Jacobs externalities of labor markets in our model, we actually estimated a cross-section
model. The next stage would be to test the dynamics of human capital externalities. Simon
et al. [41] found considerable persistence of the effects of human capital, indicating that
the distribution of human capital established in the first decade of the twentieth century
played a role in the current status of American cities. They also found that the presence of
human capital is less important today than in the past, perhaps reflecting the decline in the
costs of transportation and communication. However, Gaspar and Glaeser [17] argued that
information technology and face-to-face interactions could be complements rather than sub-
stitutes. Empirical testing of the effects of information technology on knowledge spillovers
would be a very interesting topic in the near future. Finally, but not least important, since
human capital externalities can be capitalized into housing values, our next research topic
is to estimate a hedonic housing model including local labor market attributes to test Lucas
conjecture. 12
12Lucas (27, p.270-271) wrote "...an externality-based theory of cities might let us use the information
contained in urban land price gradients to estimate the size of the externalities associated with human capital
accumulation. "
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Appendix
TABLE A-I
Some Summary Statistics
Mean Std. deviation Min. Max.
Number of workers in a tract 242 485 8527
Number of workers in a blockgroup 61 151 2664
Number of workers in a block 13 40 1003
Number of blockgroups in a tract 4.0 1.7 1 9
Number of blocks in a blockgroup 4.6 3.3 1 25
Mean hourly wage in a tract 14.49 3.4
Mean hourly wage in a blockgroup 14.54 7.14
Mean hourly wage in a block 14.42 10.42
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TABLE A-2
Industry Code
1990 census codeIndustry
Construction
Manufacturing
Public utility
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, real estate, insurance
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment
Professional services
Public administration
Computer
High-tech industry*
60-99
100-399
400-499
500-579
580-699
700-720
721-760
761-799
800-811
812-899
900-939
732-739
181, 321-330, 352-359
362-369, 371-380
*: The classification of high-tech industry is based on Maggioni [28].
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TABLE A-3
Occupation Code
Occupation
Managerial, professional specialty
Engineers, architects, surveyors
Mathematical, computer scientists
Natural scientists
Health diagnosing occupation
Teachers, librarians, archivists
Social scientists, urban planners
Writers, artists, entertainers, athletes
Technicians
Sales
Administrative
Service
Mechanics, repairers
Construction
Precision production
Machine operators, tenders
Transportation, material moving
Handlers, equipment cleaners, laborers
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1990 Census code
1-42
43-63
64-68
69-83
84-112
113-165
166-182
183-202
203-242
243-302
303-402
403-472
503-552
553-612
628-702
703-802
803-863
864-902
TABLE A-4
Summary Statistics for Selected Industries and Occupations
Index Mean Std. deviation
Managerial AveEduOcc 0.601 0.195
professional specialty OccSpec 0.153 0.060
OccDens 0.039 0.138
Writers, artists AveEduOcc 0.673 0.326
entertainers, athletes OccSpec 0.027 0.022
OccDens 0.008 0.023
Mathematical AveEduOcc 0.817 0.284
computer scientists OccSpec 0.017 0.017
OccDens 0.006 0.018
Manufacturing AveEduInd 0.372 0.247
IndSpec 0.136 0.120
IndDens 0.022 0.051
Finance, insurance AveEduInd 0.438 0.260
real estate IndSpec 0.080 0.067
IndDens 0.025 0.135
Retail AveEduInd 0.253 0.168
IndSpec 0.174 0.091
IndDens 0.027 0.058
Overall AveEdu 0.419 0.126
OccDiver 0.864 0.057
IndDiver 0.759 0.105
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TABLE A-5
Correlation Matrix
Ave. AveEdu. AveEdu. Oee. Ind. Oee. Ind. Oee. Ind.
Edu. Oee. Ind. Spec. Spec. Diver. Diver. Dens. Dens.
AveEdu 1.000
AveEduOee 0.386 1.000
AveEduInd 0.563 0.519 1.000
OeeSpee 0.044 -0.018 0.049 1.000
IndSpee 0.164 0.241 0.390 0.118 1.000
OeeDiver -0.161 -0.062 -0.090 -0.271 -0.088 1.000
IndDiver -0.289 -0.112 -0.163 -0.042 -0.566 0.156 1.000
OeeDens 0.360 0.142 0.223 0.376 0.002 -0.313 0.041 1.000
IndDens 0.432 0.247 0.399 0.124 0.333 -0.291 -0.175 0.670 1.000
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Chapter 3
What Has Been Capitalized Into Property
Values: Human Capital, Social Capital, or
Cultural Capital?
3.1 Introduction
Urban amenities are location-specific goods attached to urban land (Diamond and Tolley
[12]). To utilize amenities, people have to move to the location where amenities are attached.
Therefore, the use of urban amenities is closely related to the use of urban land.
Two types of urban amenities have been applied to partly explain the spatial variations
of land rents or property values, also known as the capitalization of urban amenities. 1 The
first type is natural (physical) amenities. Such amenities include transportation accessibility
(Alonso [1]), climate (Roback [45]), the quality of views (Pollard [38]), pollution (Ridker and
Henning [43]), noise (Li and Brown [30], Vaughan and Huckins [53]), sports facilities (Do
and Grudnitski [14]), and open spaces and parks (Weicher and Zerbst [54], Irwin [27]). The
second type of urban amenities is related to local social environment or milieu, including
school quality (Haurin [24], Brasington [6], Chiodo et al. [9]), crime (Roback [45]), and
racial concentration or segregation (Laurenti [29], Smith [47]).2
The observed second type of urban amenities is actually the consequences of social
interactions among urban populations. Wherever people concentrate, they form a social
environment within which different types of social interactions take place. Information
spillovers, peer effects, and neighborhood effects play a very important role in shaping
pupils' school achievement (Zimmer and Toma [55]) , criminal behavior (Glaeser et al.
1 The spatial variations of property values include not only the inter-city and intra-city variation of
property values in the static context (cross-sectional variation), but also the spatial-intertemporal variation
of property value appreciation.
2Roback's [45] empirical testing shows that local unemployment, population density, and population
growth are amenities and, therefore, are capitalized into residential site value; but, crime and climate are
not significant.
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[16]), and labor market outcomes in cities (O'Regan and Quigley [37]). In this paper, we
are particularly interested in how social interactions at neighborhood levels affect housing
values. We define social amenities as the location-specific environment of social interactions,
where urban residents interact with each other, and directly study the impact of local
social amenities on property values. Here, "local" refers to residential neighborhoods at
microgeographic levels, such as census tracts, blockgroups, and blocks.
Social amenities could be either consumption amenities or production amenities, or both.
For example, the concentration of well-educated residents can promote local information
diffusion and learning, but it can also create a safer and more pleasant living environment.
Unlike natural amenities that may charge user fees, impact fees, taxes, or tolls, social
amenities are generally not priced. Therefore, studying unpriced externalities from social
amenities may have important policy implications on public education, urban labor markets,
and housing markets.
Following the pioneer work by Becker [3], Coleman [10], and Bourdieu [5], we classify
social amenities into three categories: human capital, social capital, and cultural capital.
By using the 1990 Massachusetts census data, we estimate hedonic housing models with
social amenities. We find that: (1) Human capital has significant positive effects on property
values, which tests the Lucas conjecture. 3 (2) Different types of social capital have different
effects on property values. An increase in the percentage of new residents has significant
positive effects on property values, probably due to the strength of weak ties. However,
an increase in the percentage of single-parent households has negative effects on property
3Lucas [33] constructed a human-capital-externalities-based city model and concluded that human capital
externalities can be capitalized into land values.
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values. An increase in the home ownership rate has positive effects at large geographic
levels, which is consistent with the argument that homeowners have strong incentives to
invest in social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser [13]). (3) The effects of cultural capital
vary from large to small geographical scales: English proficiency and racial homogeneity
have positive effects at and beyond the tract level, but have insignificant effects at the block
level. This is probably because English proficiency is more important for communication in
larger geographic areas and people care more about the homogeneity of their communities
but less with regard to their direct neighbors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the concept of three
types of social amenities, section 3 constructs a theoretical model to derive the capitalization
of social amenities. Section 4 presents the econometric model and the measurement of social
amenities, and section 5 introduces the dataset. Section 6 describes how property values
are imputed for rental housing units, and section 7 presents the estimate results. Section 8
discusses further research issues and concludes.
3.2 HUlllan capital, social capital, and cultural capital as so-
cial aIIlenities
Urban social amenities are referred to as the local social milieu or the local environment of
social interactions in cities, which include human capital, social capital, and cultural capital.
This section explains briefly what each type of social amenities means and how they can be
rneasured by a set of variables. However, the details on the construction of variables will
be left to section 4.
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3.2.1 Human capital
Human capital is the knowledge and skills embodied in individuals. Though each indi-
vidual worker can reap the benefit of his (or her) human capital accumulation, extensive
studies (Moretti [36]) show that social interactions between skilled workers can generate a
significant amount of learning externalities or knowledge spillovers. Those uncompensated
learning externalities are considered the driving force of long-run economic growth (Romer
[44], Lucas [32]) and the reason why cities exist (Henderson [25]). Fu [15] tested four types
of human capital externalities through which workers learn from each other through social
interactions in the workplace: quality of human capital, Marshallian labor market external-
ities, Jacobs labor market externalities, and the thickness of the local labor market. One of
the purposes of this paper is to test further the effects of local human capital externalities
on residential property values.
There are at least three important mechanisms of human capital affecting property
values.
The first is that in order to achieve spatial equilibrium, land and housing rents must
adjust correspondingly to the increase in individual earnings resulting from human capi-
tal externalities. A general equilibrium model by Roback [45] shows that human capital
quality differences can be reflected in both wages and the rent gradient. A human-capital-
externalities-based city model by Lucas [33] implies that human capital externalities can
be capitalized into land values. These theories have been supported by empirical studies.
Rauch [41], the first to examine the effect of human capital quality on housing rents, treated
the Metropolitan Statistical Areas average level of formal education and working experi-
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ence as a local public good, and found that the semi-elasticity of housing rents to average
education is about 0.1"'0.2, depending on the model specifications. Shapiro [46] found that
metropolitan areas richer in high human capital residents tend to experience faster growth
in housing values: between 1940 and 1990, a 10% increase in the share of college educated
residents corresponded to a 0.7% increase in the growth of house values. Glaeser et al. [21]
also found that at the metropolitan level, education levels have a positive effect on future
housing price growth (maybe due to a productivity effect). At the city level, low levels
of human capital predict urban decline and falling housing prices (maybe because of the
localized social interactions).
The second mechanism of human capital affecting property values is that the social
benefit of education reduces the probability of engaging in socially costly activities, such as
committing a crime (Lochner [31]). This will make residential neighborhoods safer.
The third reason is that skilled neighbors, themselves, are attractive consumption ameni-
ties (Glaeser et al. [20]).
Existing empirical studies (Rauch [41], Shapiro [46]) considered only one of the multiple
dimensions of human capital externalities, the quality of human capital stock, at macrogeo-
graphic levels. However, other aspects, such as the density and diversity of human capital,
may also be very important. Testing how human capital externalities affect property values
at macrogeographic levels fails to control for the impact of local natural amenities (such as
city-level amenities) and the spatial difference of housing production efficiency. We estimate
hedonic housing models at microgeographic levels with location fixed effects to avoid those
problems.
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3.2.2 Social capital
Social capital refers to the relations between people that can be used to reach other re-
sources or facilitate certain actions of actors (Coleman [10]).4 Coleman found that social
capital within family and beyond family in a neighborhood affects the creation of human
capital. The social capital within a family is the relation between children and parents.
Evidence shows that children from single-parent families have less desirable educational
and personality outcomes than children from married-couple families because single-parent
families have structural deficiency and tend to change residence more often (Coleman [10],
McLanahan and Sandefur [34]). The social interactions between parents in a community
(intergenerational closure), such as the social interactions among churchgoers, also have
positive effects on children's school performance.
Social capital, specifically, the strength, diversity, and content of network ties, also has
important effects on labor market outcomes (Montgomery [35]) and business innovations
(Ruef [42], Huysman and Wulf [26]). Friendship and familial relationships are examples of
strong ties in terms of the time and emotions invested in a relationship (Granovetter [22]).
People in a strong tie network are familiar with and trust each other, but they have rela-
tively homogenous information and may impose pressures for social conformity. Therefore,
strong ties are less important in spreading information or resources. In contrast, people
in a weak tie network can provide new and disparate information and impose less confor-
mity, which promotes innovation.5 Social capital created by tight community networks is
4 Coleman listed three types of social capital: trust and reciprocity, information channel, norms and effec-
tive sanctions in a community. Glaeser et al. [18] constructed an individual-based social capital investment
model, and also provided some evidence on what affects individuals' investment in social capital.
5Burt [8] emphasized that weak ties can be sources of new knowledge and resources. Studies of business
networks (Uzzi [51, 52]) show that economic action often benefits from initial increase in relational ties, but
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useful to parents, teachers, and police authorities and has an impact on children's school
performance, juvenile delinquency and its prevention, job search and occupational attain-
ment, and ethnic immigration and business. Putnam [40] argued that social capital at the
community level is a strong predictor of educational performance, crime rate, and other
measures of neighborhood quality of life.
Not all social capital is productive (Portes [39]). The strength of strong ties in poor
urban communities in inner cities may deprive their residents of sources of useful information
about employment opportunities elsewhere and ways to attain them (Stack [48]).
We have not found empirical studies on the impact of social capital on property values.
DiPasquale and Glaeser [13] argued that home ownership can promote residents' investment
In social capital, both through the direct incentive effect and the longer tenure. Here,
we tentatively use the percentage of different types of households in a neighborhood to
measure the stock of social capital at the community level, including home ownership rate.
Explanations are detailed in section 3.
3.2.3 Cultural capital
Cultural capital refers to the values, norms, customs, and cultural traditions that serve to
identify and bind together a given group of people. 6 It is expressed in people's behavior,
through shared language, working attitudes, and belief systems. Much cultural capital is
not taught, but rather, it is formed through interactions with people from the same culture.
Race, language spoken, and religion are the main indicators of cultural capital. Studies on
suffers when actors are highly embedded.
6This definition is based on Throsby [49].
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residential segregation and labor market race discrimination show that cultural capital has
important effects on housing and labor markets. The so-called cultural capital hypothesis
in the labor market argues that it is the deterioration in individual responsibility and
family morals and values that are principally responsible for continued inequality in urban
America over the last two decades (Darby [11]).7 The Harvard students' experiments done
by Glaeser et al. [17] show that trustworthiness declines among peers from different races
or nationalities. The bounded solidarity in a homogenous racial community, identification
with one's own group, sect, or community can be a powerful motivational force. This may
imply that heterogeneity in terms of cultural background may decrease trustworthiness in
social groups.
The interest in and debates on racial segregation and property values have been going on
for almost a century (Laurenti [29], pp. 5-6). The representative study would be Kain and
Quigley [28]. Our perspective is different in the sense that we try to identify the relationship
between social interactions derived from cultural capital and property values.
In this paper, two variables are used to measure cultural capital: the percentage of
residents who spoke English well and the neighborhood diversity in terms of races.
3.3 The social amenity cOlllponent of land values
Consumption amenities can be directly capitalized into property values since the only way to
consume them is to live in the same location. Productive amenities, such as human capital
externalities, have positive effects on labor market outcomes. This will result in migration.
7 However, using data from the Multi-City Survey of Urban Inequality, Bienenstock and Stoloff [4] found
that the negative effects of cultural capital are not significant after controlling for human capital.
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Migration to higher wage locations leads to high housing rents in order to restore spatial
equilibrium where utility levels are equalized across locations. This section constructs a
simple monocentric city model incorporating both consumption and production amenities.
The model is adapted from the local public goods model of Roback [45], and Rauch [41], as
well as the urban amenities' model of Diamond and Tolley [12], and the monocentric city
model by Brueckner [7].
In a monocentric city with a central business district (CBD) as the center, identical
residents commute to the CBD to work and bid for residential locations with local amenities
to maximize individual utility. Consider the following individual problem:
Max U[L(x), A(x), Z(x)],
L,A,Z,x
s.t. Z(x) + T(x) + R[x, A(x)]L(x) + T(X) = B(x)Y, (2)
where x is the location of x miles away from the CBD. A representative resident chooses
lot size L(x), consumption amenities A(x), and composite consumption goods Z(x) to
maximize his or her utility. Note that A(x) denotes consumption amenities other than 10-
cational accessibility, since accessibility has been incorporated into the consumption of lot
size. Amenities may be priced, such as accessibility, whose price is the transport cost T(x);
or financed by location-based taxation T(X), such as city-wide public goods; or unpriced,
such as social amenities. Y is individual earnings. B(x) is production amenities at location
x, such as learning externalities from communication with well-educated neighbors, which
could affect individual productivity and thus individual earnings. Here, production ameni-
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ties are treated as a productivity shift. R[x, A(x)] is the land rents per unit area at location
x. Note that land rents directly depend on both distance itself (locational accessibility) and
consumption amenities, but not production amenities. Equation (2) is the budget constraint
at location x for a representative resident.
The first order conditions are as follows:
au == AR
aL '
au
az == A.
In equilibrium, a resident must be indifferent between any locations, which implies
U'(x) == o.
Also at each location, the budget constraint must be binding, which means
Z'(x) + T'(x) + R'(x)L + RL'(x) + T'(X) == B'(x)Y.
Combining (3)-(7), we obtain the generalized Muth condition
R'( ) == -T'(x) - T'(X) + B'(x)Y aR A,()x L(x) + 8A x.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(8) shows that the land rents gradient, or the spatial variation of equilibrium land rents
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per unit area consists of four components per unit area: the savings of transportation
costs ~}:}, the taxation difference ~~?, the difference of benefit from production amenities
B~~~r, and the difference of the marginal value of consumption amenities RAA'(x). In
summary, amenities, including accessibility, taxation, other natural amenities, and unpriced
social amenities, are all capitalized into land rents.
Since land values can be inferred from housing values after controlling for housing char-
acteristics and neighborhood attributes, we will employ an hedonic housing model with
urban amenities to test (8).
The above model only shows the capitalization of urban amenities within a city or
metropolitan area. The model can be extended easily to an inter-city or inter-metropolitan
case with city or metropolitan specific amenities, by introducing a Tiebout sorting mecha-
nism (Tiebout [50]).8
3.4 Hedonic housing lllodel with social alllenities
To control for the difference in natural amenities and housing production efficiency at macro-
geographic levels, we estimate hedonic housing models with social amenities at microgeo-
graphic levels. The first benchmark model is specified at the census tract level:
(9)
where Pnj is the reported or imputed housing value of housing unit n at census tract
j; a is a constant; Ac is a county fixed effect, representing natural amenities that serve at
8 For the discussion of inter-city models of urban amenities, see Bartik and Smith [2].
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least at the county level; f3 and 'Yare the coefficient vectors to be estimated; Enj is the
disturbance term, probably spatially correlated; X n is the characteristics vector of housing
unit n, variables include the number of bedrooms and other rooms, building age, and a set of
dummies for housing type (dummies for mobile, detached, attached, number of apartments
is 2, 3-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-49, and greater than 50, if lot size is greater than 10 acres, and if
there is a business or medical office on it); Xj is the attributes vector of social amenities at
census tract j, including indices measuring human capital externalities, social capital stock,
fI,nd cultural capital.
Continuing the work of Fu [15], we construct the following variables to proxy for different
dimensions of local human capital externalities at the tract level:
Average education: Percentage of residents with college or higher degree at a tract,
proxy for the quality of local human capital stock.
Occupation diversity: Occupation diversity index, proxy for the broadness of human
capital in terms of occupations at a tract. It equals one minus the Hirchman-Herfindahl
index for occupations at a tract. Let Soj denote the ratio of residents of occupation 0 at
tract j to the total residents at tract j, then
Occupation diversity == 1 - L S;jo
o
Industry diversity: Industry diversity index, proxy for the broadness of human capital
in terms of industries where residents worked at a location. It is constructed as the same
way as Occupation diversity.
Concentration: Concentration index. It equals the percentage of Boston metropolitan
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area residents who concentrated at tract j, and directly measures the thickness or density
of local social interactions. However, this index may also reflect the effect of local demand
for housing.
We tentatively use the following variables to measure social capital at the tract level:
Parent - kids households: Percentage of households with a married-couple and their
children under 18 years old at a tract.
Single - parent households: Percentage of households that are single-headed parent
with children at a tract.
Five - year households: Percentage of residents at a tract who lived in the same house
for at least five years.
H orne ownership rate: Percentage of households who are homeowners at a tract.
To check the robustness of the estimate, we also use other related variables such as
percentage of households that moved into a house within one year, within two years, and
percentage of single residents and unemployed residents at a tract.
We construct two variables to measure cultural capital:
English proficiency: Percentage of residents at a tract who spoke English well.
Race diversity: Diversity index in terms of races. It equals one minus the Hirchman-
Herfindahl index of races. Let Srj denote the ratio of residents belonging to race r at tract
j to the total number of residents at tract j, then
Race diversity = 1 - L S;jO
r
We also try the percentage of residents who spoke more than one language at a tract to
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approximate the racial diversity.
If residents commute to the CBD or subcenters to work, then commuting costs will
be capitalized into residential land rents. Therefore, we also include a variable "Average
commuting time," which is the average commuting time to the workplace (tract) from a
residential tract. It is measured by minutes.
The county fixed effects control for natural amenities with service areas at or beyond a
county, such as climate, parks, and museums. They also control for the difference of housing
production efficiency. However, they fail to capture natural amenities at the tract level and
other tract-specific attributes, such as local schools, churches, and highway intersections. To
take into account the localization of natural amenities at (or beyond) tract level, we create
the second benchmark model by constructing social interaction variables at the blockgroup
level and replacing county fixed effects with tract fixed effects. For example, Average
education now is the percentage of residents with a college degree or higher at a blockgroup.
By the same token, we also estimate a model at the block level with blockgroup fixed effects.
We use the Huber jWhite estimate of variance clustered by locations to produce consis-
tent standard errors. The estimate results are reported in section 7.
3.5 Data
We use the restricted version of the 1990 Massachusetts census data. The data set contains
information on surveyed individuals' personal characteristics, family structure, geographical
information of residence and workplaces, and housing characteristics. The sample used in
this paper is constructed as follows: select workers whose ages are between 16 and 65, living
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in the Boston metropolitan area, exclude workers whose working industry is agriculture,
mining, military, and not classified, exclude those who have disabilities that prevented
them from working. The classification of industries and occupations are listed in Table Al
and A2 in the appendix. The sample includes 142,026 housing units, 622 census tracts,
2,573 blockgroups, and 29,801 blocks. The average number of housing units in a block,
blockgroup, and tr~ct are about 5, 57, and 233, respectively.
3.6 Illlputed housing values for rental housing units
The census data contain reported housing values by owners and reported rents by tenants.
The first step of our estimation is to impute housing values for rental housing units. We
specify the following model to impute property values for rental housing units:
(10)
where Pi is the reported property values or rents of housing unit i, Owner is a dummy
variable (1 for owner-occupied units and 0 for rental units), Xi is the vector of housing
characteristics for unit i, 6 is the coefficient vector of housing characteristics to be esti-
mated. 9
The results are presented in Table 1.
9 I thank Patrick Bay for pointing out this methodology of imputing housing values for rental units.
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TABLE 1
Estimate the Coefficient of Tenure
Dependent variable: log (price or rents)
Variable Coefficient t Statistic
Constant 5.6577 362.5
Owner 5.6934 1300.6
Number of bedrooms 0.1444 80.9
Number of other rooms 0.1233 70.7
Building age -0.0012 -13.63
Dummy for mobile -0.8649 -33.83
Dummy for detach {-0.0278} -1.86
Dummy for attach {-0.0293} -1.78
Dummy for 2 apt. 0.0519 3.44
Dummy for 2-4 apt. 0.0333 2.2
Dummy for 5-9 apt. {-0.0110} -0.7
Dummy for 10-19 apt. 0.0600 3.78
Dummy for 20-49 apt. 0.1408 8.78
Dummy for >50 apt. {-0.0001} -0.01
Dummy for lot size >10 acres 0.1595 11.9
Dummy for office use 0.1421 10.5
Number of observations:132,859; Adjusted R2 = 0.969
{ }indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
After obtaining the estimated coefficient for home ownership, we impute property values
for rental housing units by using the following formula:
Imputed Property Value = Reported Rent x e5.6934.
For housing units with missing reported rents or values, we use the predicted values by
applying the estimated coefficients in Table 1.
3.7 Results
Table 2 presents the estimated results with county fixed effects. The tract, blockgroup,
and block level models construct social amenities at the tract, blockgroup, and block level,
respectively. Overall, the coefficients of housing characteristics are very stable, and many
are also similar to those in Table 1. This implies that housing characteristics are relatively
orthogonal to the neighborhood attributes.
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TABLE 2
Benchmark Model With County Fixed Effects
Tract
Variable Coefficient
Number of bedrooms 0.1402
Number of other rooms 0.0977
Building age -0.0020
Dummy mobile -0.7633
Dummy for detach {-0.0176}
Dummy for attach {-0.0005}
Dummy for 2 apt. 0.1143
Dummy for 3-4 apt. 0.1286
Dummy for 5-9 apt. {-0.0104}
Dummy for 10-19 apt. 0.0425
Dummy for 20-49 apt. 0.0842
Dummy for >50 apt. -0.0755
Dummy for lot size>10 0.1463
Dummy for office use 0.1150
Average commuting time -0.0120
Average education (%) 1.0143
Concentration (%) {24.6037}
Occupation diversity (%) {-0.9930}
Industry diversity (%) 0.5909
Five-year household (%) -0.2386
Parent-kids households (%) -0.1360
Single-parent households (%) -0.6888
Home ownership rate (%) 0.1936
English proficiency (%) 0.5614
Race diversity (%) -0.0872
Adjusted R 2 0.3158
{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
t
14.54
18.76
-3.95
-7.26
-0.70
0.02
4.87
2.75
-0.36
4.23
3.28
-2.86
9.41
12.32
-4.44
28.74
1.27
-1.71
8.30
-3.11
-2.12
-5.22
3.18
10.36
-2.25
Blockgroup
Coefficient
0.1404
0.0943
-0.0017
-0.7563
{-0.0041}
{0.0003}
0.1182
0.1257
{-O.OOOI}
0.0518
0.0775
-0.0943
0.1396
0.1163
-0.0073
0.9114
46.3307
-0.6905
0.3513
-0.1962
-0.0924
-0.6679
{0.0973}
0.2509
{-0.0321}
0.3216
t
14.66
16.23
-3.55
-7.08
-0.15
0.02
4.86
2.70
-0.00
4.94
2.50
-3.73
8.27
10.91
-3.35
25.77
2.23
-3.03
9.88
-2.77
-4.81
-14.85
1.7
7.04
-0.94
Block
Coefficient
0.1406
0.0957
-0.0012
-0.7668
{0.0188}
{-0.0077}
0.1119
0.1134
{0.0123}
0.0538
0.0863
-0.0708
0.1588
0.1128
-0.0014
0.4967
326.8253
0.0680
{-0.0245}
-0.1206
-0.0550
-0.3149
{0.0378}
0.0540
-0.0487
0.2957
t
9.71
10.00
-1.96
-7.45
0.50
-0.35
3.90
2.34
0.30
4.02
2.86
-2.72
8.61
8.83
-3.21
13.05
3.23
2.97
-0.83
-2.48
-2.82
-3.3
0.81
3.64
-3.80
For the tract level model, let us first look at the human capital variables. The elasticity
of property value to the quality of local human capital stock (Average education) is 1.01.
The effect of concentration of employed residents is not significant but is large (elasticity is
24.6). The elasticity of industry diversity is about 0.59. These results are consistent with
the findings in Fu [15]. The effect of occupation diversity is negative, this is surprising, but
not significant.
For social capital variables, the proportion of old households has a negative effect on
property value: a 1% increase in the residents who lived in the same house more than five
years at a tract is associated with a 0.24% decrease in property values. In Table 3 column
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C, we replace this index with the percentage of households who moved in within one, two to
five, and more than 10 years at a tract. The coefficient of the percentage of households that
moved in within one year is positive and significant, the other two coefficients are negative
and significant. This further confirms the effects of tenure. This could be explained by
the strength of weak ties. Though old residents have built more social connections with
neighbors, the redundant information from social interactions is not very useful. New
movers brought new information and social networks to the neighborhood, and made the
neighborhood more dynamic and interesting. 10
The effect of the percentage of single-parent households is negative, and this is not
surprising. What is surprising is that the coefficient of the percentage of married-couple-
with-kids household is negative. Since such families have more within-family social capital,
and parents most likely socialize with each other if their children attend the same local
school, we expect this social capital variable to have a positive effect on property values.
This needs further investigation.
Home ownership promotes household's investment in social capital (DiPasquale and
Glaeser [13]). The elasticity of housing value to home ownership rate is 0.19. Combining
with the analysis of the effects of residence length, we can tentatively infer the trade-
off of promoting home ownership: on the one hand, home ownership per se can promote
investment in social capital; on the other hand, long tenure tends to block the flow of new
information and the formation of new social capital.
10 Moving to a new community tends to destroy established bonds with old community, thus depriving
family and children of existing network ties. But, parental support and higher expectation for children can
compensate for the loss of community among migrants (Hagan et al. [23]).
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For cultural capital variables, the coefficient of the percentage of residents who spoke
English well is positive. This is straightforward since good English facilitates social inter-
actions and civic engagement. The effect of racial diversity is negative; this means that
people prefer to live in a community with others of the same cultural background. This is
observed in Boston, for example: Brookline is a Jewish neighborhood, South Boston is an
Irish cluster, the North End is predominantly Italian, and the South End has a large Puerto
Rican community. However, if housing markets are segregated by race discrimination, then
the discriminated race will have to pay higher housing price or rents. Therefore, we can
only tentatively conclude that, in general, the homogeneity of race is an amenity.
Table 3 further presents different specifications of the benchmark model at the tract
level. The results show that our model specification in Table 2 is pretty robust.
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TABLE 3
Different Model Specifications at the Tract Level
A B C D
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Average education 1.0601 1.0044 0.9722 1.0018
34.43 23.89 40.68 25.97
Concentration {31.7206} {28.4631} {21.8769} {23.1097}
1.56 1.62 1.08 1.25
Occupation diversity {-0.8330} {-0.9124} {-1.0688} -1.2429
-1.30 -1.56 -1.78 -3.53
Industry diversity 0.6015 0.4607 0.6658 0.6437
8.44 4.42 10.57 10.22
Five-year household(%) {-0.1041} -0.2318 -0.2076
-1.83 -2.76 -2.77
Move in within 1 year 0.1875
2.16
Move in within 2-5 year -0.3233
-4.21
Move in 10 years ago -0.2059
-2.03
Unemployment (%) -1.1439
-3.36
Parent-kids households {0.0059} {-0.1228} -0.1629 -0.1287
0.09 -1.4 -2.73 -2.22
Single-parent households -0.7494 -0.7415 -0.5494 -0.7386
-6.49 -5.74 -3.17 -7.55
Ownership rate 0.1790 0.1867 0.1817
2.09 3.37 3.67
English proficiency 0.5023 0.5741 0.5459 1.2733
8.18 9.30 10.25 3.83
Race diversity -0.0999 {-0.0969} -0.0671
-2.43 -2.86 -2.37
Multi-language -0.6428
-2.75
Adjusted R 2 0.3150 0.3161 0.3167 0.3161
{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
The numbers below the coefficients are t test statistics.
If economic activities and social interactions are distributed evenly, then the coefficients
from tract, blockgroup, and block level variables should be the same. However, Table 2
shows that coefficients become smaller when moved down to lower geographic levels. This
probably is due to measurement errors, but it also may hint that there exists a certain
spatial pattern of social interactions.
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County fixed effects control for amenities whose service areas are at least at the county
level, such as climate, major highway, and national parks. However, they fails to control
amenities of lower service areas, such as local schools, churches, shopping malls, secondary
highways. To better estimate the effects of social amenities, we construct all social amenity
indices at the blockgroup level, and estimate the model with tract fixed effects. Results are
presented in Table 4 where the coefficients of housing characteristics are suppressed.
TABLE 4
Benchmark Model at the Blockgroup Level
County fixed effects
Coefficient t
Average commuting time -0.0073 -3.35
Average education 0.9114 25.77
Concentration 46.3307 2.23
Occupation diversity -0.6905 -3.03
Industry diversity 0.3513 9.88
Five-year households -0.1962 -2.77
Parent-kids households -0.0924 -4.81
Single-parent households -0.6679 -14.85
Home ownership rate {-0.973} -1.70
English proficiency 0.2509 7.04
Race diversity {-0.0321} -0.94
Adjusted R 2 0.3216
{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
Tract fixed effects
Coefficient t
-0.0005 -0.35
0.4733 10.56
56.2082 3.62
{-0.3253} -1.86
{0.0595} 0.48
-0.2096 -5.73
{-O.0501} -1.19
-0.5419 -6.68
{0.0371} 0.99
{0.0371} 0.46
{-0.0135} -0.35
0.3576
In Table 4, the tract fixed effects model, the coefficient of average commuting time is not
significant, though it is still negative. This is not surprising since tract fixed effects control
for local transport accessibility very well. For human capital variables, the diversity indices
are not significant, probably because human capital externalities through diversity take
place mainly at the workplace and on large geographic scale instead of small residential
places. For social capital variables, the effects of percentage of married-couple-with-kids
households and home ownership rates become insignificant. This is a bit puzzling. One
interpretation could be that the social interactions and civic engagement among parents
and homeowners are beyond blockgroup level.
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The effects of cultural capital in terms of English proficiency and race diversity become
insignificant. Residents probably spoke their native languages more frequently at home
and nearby social occasions, so English proficiency becomes not so important as in large
geographic area communication. Also, people may care more about the homogeneity of
their community, but may be less concerned about where their direct neighbors came from.
By the same token, we also estimate the model at the block level with blockgroup fixed
effects. Results are presented in Table 5. The results are very similar with the blockgroup
level model with tract fixed effects. Since only a few amenities serve within a blockgroup
scope, we believe the blockgroup level model with tract fixed effects is the most appropriate
specification.
TABLE 5
Benchmark Model at the Block Level
County fixed effects
Variable Coefficient t
Average commuting time -0.0014 -3.21
Average education 0.4967 13.05
Concentration 326.8253 3.23
Occupation diversity 0.0680 2.97
Industry diversity {-0.0245} -0.83
Five-year households -0.1206 -2.48
Parent-kids households -0.0550 -2.82
Single-parent households -0.3149 -3.30
Home ownership rate {0.0378} 0.81
English proficiency 0.0540 3.64
Race diversity -0.0487 -3.80
Adjusted R 2 0.2956
{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
Tract fixed effects
Coefficient t
{0.0005} 1.67
0.2110 15.10
366.4435 6.20
0.0552 2.52
{-0.0072} -0.37
-0.1154 -11.05
{-0.0134} -1.55
-0.1831 -8.36
{0.0066} 0.43
{0.0105} 0.50
{-0.0245} -1.20
0.3634
Blockgroup fixed effects
Coefficient t
{0.0004} 1.75
0.1616 13.52
345.8265 5.22
0.0428 2.26
{-0.0014} 0.08
-0.0992 -10.74
{-0.0011} -0.15
-0.1354 -7.44
{-0.0051} -0.41
{0.0193} 1.12
{-0.0174} -0.94
0.3938
To identify which geographic level of social interactions is most important, we also
estimate a county fixed effects model by including social interaction indices at the block,
blockgroup, and tract level. The results are reported in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
Benchmark Model at the Block, Blockgroup, and Tract Level
A B C
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Average education-t 0.4885 8.26 0.5153 8.68 0.7922 13.91
Average education-bg 0.3627 13.6 0.5265 13.45
Average education-b 0.1873 10.6 0.2350 9.89
Concentration-t {21.2346} 1.20 {19.8428} 1.10 {22.5367} 1.29
Concentration-bg {-2.0809} -0.2 30.201 2.22
Concentration-b 257.0416 3.55 254.6850 3.80
Occupation diversity-t {-0.6000} -1.14 {-0.6927} -1.40 -1.0760 -2.06
Occupation diversity-bg -0.5309 -2.95 -0.3732 -2.39
Occupation diversity-b 0.0575 2.44 0.0523 2.61
Industry diversity-t 0.6256 5.19 0.5928 3.70 0.6213 10.34
Industry diversity-bg {0.0418} 0.45 {0.0905} 0.73
Industry diversity-b {-0.0043} -0.19 0.0015 0.08
Five-year households-t {0.0449} 0.99 {-0.0118} -0.19 {-0.0513} -1.01
Five-year households-bg -0.1054 -5.8 -0.2039 -6.94
Five-year households-b -0.1049 -5.7 -0.1206 -5.14
Parent-kids households-t {0.0261} 0.37 {-0.0766} -1.20 -0.1718 -3.12
Parent-kids households-bg -0.0620 -2.59 -0.0518 -2.50
Parent-kids households-b {-0.0053} -0.65 -0.0148 -1.64
Single-parent households-t {-0.0861} -0.69 {-0.1059} -0.70 -0.4735 -3.11
Single-parent households-bg -0.4422 -6.13 -0.5644 -7.02
Single-parent households-b -0.1271 -3.94 -0.1828 -4.52
Home ownership rate-t 0.1585 6.2 0.1514 4.55 0.1892 3.92
Home ownership rate-bg {0.0386} 1.00 {0.0214} 0.44
Home ownership rate-b {-0.0107} -0.36 -0.1206 -5.14
English proficiency-t 0.5745 4.07 0.5077 4.01 0.5832 9.03
English proficiency-bg {0.0024} 0.02 {0.0399} 0.46
English proficiency-b 0.0209 2.64 {0.0153} 1.07
Race diversity-t -0.0932 -2.48 -0.0922 -2.05 -0.0752 -2.22
Race diversity-bg {0.0151} 0.41 {0.0139} 0.55
Race diversity-b {-0.0090} -0.64 -0.0196 -1.54
Adjusted R 2 0.3367 0.3266 0.3320
{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level. "-t" , "-bg", and "-b" indicate
variables are constructed at the tract, blockgroup, and block level, respectively.
A few points worth noting in Table 6 Column A. For human capital variables, the quality
of local human capital stock is always positive and significant; the thickness of human
capital is significant at the block level; the effect of industry diversity is significant at the
tract level. All these results are consistent with Fu [15] where social interactions take place
in the workplace. However, the effect of occupation diversity is only significant at the block
level; this is somewhat surprising. The effects of most social capital are significant at the
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blockgroup level, but we are not sure if in real life most social connections and networks are
within blockgroup scope. The effect of home ownership rate is only significant at the tract
level, probably meaning that homeowners engage in larger geographic scale communications.
The effects of cultural capital are significant at the tract level, which confirms our early
analysis. Column B drops block level variables, column C drops blockgroup level variables;
these results are consistent with column A.
All the above models consider only social interactions among local residents. However,
workers whose workplace and residential location are different may also interact with local
residents in the workplace. Such social interactions between local residents and commuting-
in workers may also play an important role. To explore this effect, for each residential
location, we count workers living there and workers working but not living there, then
construct social amenity indices based on this resident-worker sample. We expect the effects
of social interactions will be stronger. The results, presented in Table A-3 in the appendix,
indeed show that (the absolute values of) most coefficients of social amenities become larger.
3.8 Discussion and conclusion
This paper classifies three types of social amenities: human capital, social capital, and
cultural capital at microgeographic levels. We used the 1990 Massachusetts census data
and estimate the effects of social amenities on residential property values. We found that
human capital externalities have strong positive effects on property values. Different types
of social capital have different effects on property values; the home ownership rate has a
positive effect at large geographic levels, while the percentage of households with short
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tenure has a positive effect on property values, probably due to the strength of weak ties.
The percentage of single-parent households has negative effect on property values. Cultural
capital's effects vary from high to low geographic levels, positive at and beyond the tract
level, but insignificant at the block level.
There are a few issues worth further discussion. First, our indices proxy for social ameni-
ties are experimental and incomplete. A better data set is needed to further investigate the
impact of local social interactions on property values. Second, not only do social interac-
tions affect property values, but, also, housing has a broad set of social consequences on
occupants (Glaeser and Sacerdote [19]). However, this does not cause endogeneity problems
in our estimation since we use a cross-section model and neighborhood attributes. The third
question is that the classification of human capital, social capital, and cultural capital is
not a consensus. Some writers argue that human capital includes both social capital and
cultural capital. But if this becomes consensus, it will change only the title of this paper.
Fourth, the three types of capital are correlated. Well-educated people have stronger social
skills or higher status, which make them access more social capital; social capital affects
the creation of human capital, as Coleman [10] argued. However, our huge sample size can
partly remedy this problem.
The last, but not least important, issue is sorting effects. Well-educated people may
prefer to socialize with well-educated peers, and easily develop trust and trustworthiness;
they also have higher income and demand for high quality housing and neighborhood. This
issue needs further investigation.
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Appendix:
TABLE A-I Industry Code
Industry
Construction
Manufacturing
Public utility
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Finance, real estate, and insurance
Business and repair services
Personal services
Entertainment
Professional services
Public administration
1990 census code
60-99
100-399
400-499
500-579
580-699
700-720
721-760
761-799
800-811
812-899
900-939
TABLE A-2 Occupation Code
Occupation
Managerial, professional specialty
Engineers, architects, surveyors
Mathematical, computer scientists
Natural scientists
Health diagnosing occupation
Teachers, librarians, archivists
Social scientists, urban planners
Writers, artists, entertainers, athletes
Technicians
Sales
Administrative
Service
Mechanics, repairers
Construction
Precision production
Machine operators, tenders
Transportation, material moving
Handlers, equipment cleaners, laborers
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1990 Census code
1-42
43-63
64-68
69-83
84-112
113-165
166-182
183-202
203-242
243-302
303-402
403-472
503-552
553-612
628-702
703-802
803-863
864-902
TABLE A-3
Resident-Worker Social Interaction Model
Tract Blockgroup Block
Variable Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Average education 1.1358 35.28 0.4827 9.66 0.1606 13.43
Concentration {29.0092} 1.26 {36.9908} 2.30 217.2624 4.06
Occupation diversity -2.0218 -6.05 -0.4821 -2.83 {0.0221} 1.20
Industry diversity 0.6130 6.20 {-0.0927} -0.99 0.0121 0.71
Five-year households -0.2929 -2.91 -0.3126 -7.61 -0.1090 -12.23
Parent-kids households -0.2080 -2.38 {-0.0755} -1.57 {-0.0075} -1.05
Single-parent households -0.8131 -6.27 -0.5839 -5.81 -0.1452 -7.65
Home ownership rate 0.2366 3.00 {0.0547} 1.28 {0.0148} -1.13
English proficiency 0.7090 10.43 {-0.0483} -0.51 {0.0152} 0.82
Race diversity -0.1634 -3.32 {-0.0006} -0.01 {-0.0050} -0.26
Adjusted R2 0.3095 0.3571 0.3924
Fixed effects County Tract Blockgroup
{ } indicates insignificance at the 5% level.
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